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NOTE
"Mother of Mercy-Is This The End of Rico?"--Justice
Scalia Invites Constitutional Void-for-Vagueness
Challenge to RICO "Pattern"
Arthur Liman [Michael Milken's defense lawyer] called the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) law "vague" and said
prosecutors use of it reminded him of "an earlier era in which a sheriff
could arrest almost anyone he didn't like" on vagrancy charges . . .
The way RICO presently is enforced, "there probably isn't an invest-
ment banking firm or a securities trader that is not a felon," Liman
said.
-The Federalist Society 2
[I]f ever there were a case outside the organized crime area that
seemed appropriate for RICO prosecution, it is the case against
Milken and Drexel ... Milken built... "the brass-knuckles, threaten-
ing, market-manipulating Cosa Nostra of the securities world."
-Connie Bruck, The Predators' Ball 3
I. Introduction: RICO Comes to Wall Street:
"Well, Rico, business good?' 4
During the spring and summer of 1989 RICO struck with a fury,
sweeping the headlines of most major business publications. First,
Michael Milken, junkbond king-pin for the investment firm Drexel Burn-
ham Lambert, was indicted on ninety-eight counts of federal racketeering
which sought $1.85 billion in forfeitures. Mr. Milken later pleaded guilty
to six lesser felonies and agreed to pay a record $600 million in fines and
restitution.5 Simultaneously, Drexel was negotiating its RICO charges
1 This famous last line of the movie Little Caesar was uttered by the principal character Rico-
played by Edward G. Robinson-at his death. LrrrLE CAESAR 174 (G. Peary ed. 1981) (Screen play
by Francis Edwards Faragoh, from the novel by W.R. Burnett) [hereinafter LrrTLE CAESAR]. The
1931 Warner Bros. movie firmly etched the Edward G. Robinson caricature into the minds of
Depression America as the ultimate gangster. Indeed, Jack Warner suggested in his autobiography
that he made the movie because he thought the Rico character "was a thinly disguised portrait of Al
Capone." J. WARNER & D. JENNING, MY FIRST HUNDRED YEARS IN HOLLYWOOD 199 (1964). Several
commentators have speculated that RICO's title was derived from the Edward G. Robinson
character. See, e.g., Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action In Context: Reflections On Bennett v. Berg, 58
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237 n.3 (1982). As noted therein, amid all the speculation, Professor Blakey
"who had a major role in drafting the statute... will neither admit nor deny that the title was [so]
constructed." The Legal Times, Oct. 8, 1979, at 32, col. 1.
2 The Federalist Society, News Release (Sept. 16, 1989) (address to the Federalist Society's
Third Annual Lawyers Convention).
3 C. BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BALL 370 (1989).
4 LrrrTLE CAESAR, supra note 1, at 120.
5 See N.Y. Times, April 25, 1990, at Al, col. 4. The Milken saga needs no in-depth analysis;
droves of Wall Street lawyers are now entertained with the project, even following Milken's guilty
plea to six felonies. For an interesting chronology of Milken's rise and fall, see generally C. BRUCE,
supra note 3. See United States v. Milken, S.D.N.Y., No. 89 Cr. 41 [KBW] for the actual indictment.
with the federal government and eventually settled by agreeing to pay
$650 million in fines.6 Second, one of Milken's associates at Drexel and
five members of Princeton/Newport Partners Ltd. were convicted of
twelve counts of federal racketeering, forced to disgorge themselves of
$1.5 million, and were sentenced to three to six months in prison.7
Third, a two-year investigation of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and
Chicago Board of Trade culminated in the indictment of forty-six trad-
ers,8 eighteen of them on substantive federal racketeering charges. 9 Wall
The original allegations included one count of running a racketeering conspiracy, one count of par-
ticipating in a racketeering enterprise, 55 counts of mail and wire fraud, 11 counts of fraud in the
sale of securities, 20 counts of fraud in the purchase and sale of securities, three counts of fraud in
connection with a tender offer, six counts of filing false statements with the SEC, and one count of
assisting in the preparation of a false tax return. The racketeering charges threatened 40 years of
imprisonment and $500,000 in fines. The 96 other counts theoretically could have amounted to 480
years in prison and $24 million in fines. The government could also have sought more than $11
billion in forfeitures and fines if the racketeering charges are sustained. The stakes were large. It is
little wonder that Milken pleaded guilty rather than stand trial.
6 Wall St.J., Mar. 31, 1989, at A4, col. 6. Recently, six suits brought by private investors have
alleged that Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (mired in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings)
and its chief officers including Michael Milken, rigged thejunk bond market and defrauded investors
through a daisy-chain scheme of securities law violations and patterns of racketeering activity. Wall
St.J., Sept. 13, 1990, at B13, col 2.
7 James Sutton Regan, a managing partner, Charles M. Zarecki, Jack Z. Rabinowitz and Paul
Berkman, all general partners, and Steven Barry Smotrich, the controller, as well as Bruce Lee New-
berg, the former Drexel trader named in the Milken indictment, were convicted of substantive RICO
violations stemming from their scheme to create fraudulent tax losses. The scheme involved "park-
ing" of stock, aimed chiefly at creating $13 million in illegal tax losses. 1989 Civ. RICO Lit. Rep.
(Andrews) 4945 (August). Securities "parking" involves selling a security to another party with an
agreement to repurchase it. This "parking" is illegal to the extent it is designed to conceal owner-
ship of the security to generate tax losses, mount a takeover attempt, or similarly avoid federal law
reporting requirements. "The case has been widely viewed as the most significant to be tried since
the Government began its investigation of crime on Wall Street after the fall of Ivan F. Boesky."
N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1989, at A26, col. 2. Critics of the Princeton/Newport conviction have argued
that, "RICO means they can win convictions without bothering to prove any underlying crime."
Crovitz, RICO Needs No Stinkin' Badges, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1989, at A30, col. 3. Regardless of the
justice meted, such convictions should not reoccur. "[Tihe Justice Department has issued new
guidelines to prevent any such prosecution ever again .... The memo tells federal prosecutors not
to try another Princeton/Newport by bringing RICO or mail fraud charges based on alleged tax
violations." Id Although not binding, such guidelines appear to be more restrictive now that Mr.
Giuliani has left the U.S. Attorney's office in Manhattan.
8 On August 2, 1989, a federal grand jury in Chicago returned indictments against 46 traders at
the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange on charges that they systemically
cheated their customers. See United States v. Dempsey, N.D. Ill., Nos. 89 CR 666, 89 CR 667, 89 CR
668, and 89 CR 669. The traders worked in four separate pits: the U.S. Treasury bond pit and the
soybean pits at the CBOT, and the Japanese Yen and Swiss Franc pits at the MERC. Former U.S.
Attorney Anton Valukas said, "What we are talking about here are hundreds and thousands of trades
in which fraud was perpetrated and losses incurred by those customers because of the scheme."
1989 Civ. RICO Lit. Rep. (Andrews) 5027 (August). As of press time at least 20 traders had pleaded
guilty to federal crimes. Two traders pleaded guilty to substantive RICO charges. N.Y. Times, Aug.
29, 1990, at C16, col. 5. In the first of three trials stemming from the government's investigation of
futures traders, two members of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange were convicted of cheating cus-
tomers (while a third was acquitted). Dozens of other criminal charges against the traders resulted in
a hung jury, however. N.Y. Times, Jul. 10, 1990, at DI, col. 6.
9 Not all the press has been over-critical of RICO. See, e.g., Newkirk, No Way To Ride Out Hurri-
cane RICO, Chicago Trib., Aug. 6, 1989, § 7, at 3, col. 1 ("The exchanges can use Hurricane RICO as
a tremendous opportunity for reform, to demonstrate to the business and financial world that they
will act decisively to find and to punish corruption wherever it exists. With this attitude, they have a
good chance of keeping the futures market here and making them the strongest, cleanest and most
efficient in the world.").
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Street and LaSalle Street10 seemed overrun with RICO allegations. Was
"white-collar" America mired in a pool of corruption" and unmitigated
greed, or was the RICO net uncontrollably broad?12
In the midst of this uproar, the Supreme Court had an opportunity
to circumscribe the scope of RICO. In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co., 13 the Court unanimously rejected the offering, choosing in-
stead to invalidate the Eighth Circuit's "multiple scheme" requirement
for RICO "pattern." RICO's scope, and thus RICO's "pattern," may
best be understood by beginning withJustice Brennan's majority opinion
in H.J. Inc. 14
A. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.
In H.. Inc. several Northwestern Bell officers and employees alleg-
edly bribed members of the Minnesota Public Utilities Corporation
(MPUC) over a six year period in order to obtain higher phone billing
rates from their customers. This bribery formed the predicate acts nec-
essary to allege a "pattern of racketeering activity under section
1961(5)." 15 This pattern formed the basis of allegations under sections
1962(a), (b), (c) and (d).16 The district court dismissed the case for fail-
ure to state a claim.' 7 This disposition was consistent with the control-
ling pattern case in the Eighth Circuit, Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer,18 which
required the allegation of "multiple illegal schemes." The Eighth Circuit
upheld the lower court decision in H.J. Inc. based on this "multiple
schemes" requirement for pattern allegations.' 9 As the Supreme Court
noted, the vast majority of circuits had rejected this "multiple schemes"
requirement producing a split among the circuits.20 On this basis the
10 For an analysis of RICO and its application to commodities fraud, see Sackheim, Leto &
Friedman, Commodities Litigation: The Impact of RICO, 34 DE PAUL L. RaV. 23 (1984); Note, Partaker or
Prey? Futures Commission Merchants Under Civil RICO and the Commodity Exchange Act, 16 FoRDlw, URB.
L.J. 69 (1988).
11 "White-collar crime is the most serious and all-pervasive crime problem in America today."
Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284, 2294 n.9 (1988) (Rehnquist, CJ.) (quoting Conyers,
Corporate and White-Collar Crime: A view by the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Crime, 17 Am. CRIM.
L. REV. 287, 288 (1980)).
12 See, e.g., Rakoff, Three Unlikely Curesfor Bad Breadth, 10 RICO L. REP. 217 (1989) ("[U]ntil some
lower court adopts Justice Scalia's suggestion that RICO is unconstitutionally vague.., the great-
bellied monster of civil RICO will continue to roam the land, gobbling all in sight."). The Supreme
Court used the metaphor of the "net" as applied to RICO in Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana, 109 S.
Ct. 916, 937 n.24 (1989) ("RICO casts wide nets") citing United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 903
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) ("The federal RICO net is woven tightly to trap even the
smallest fish.").
13 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
14 Justice Brennan's majority opinion was joined by Justices Marshall, Stevens, White and
Blackmun.
15 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
16 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1988).
17 109 S. Ct. at 2898.
18 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986).
19 109 S. Ct. at 2898 (citing 829 F.2d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1987)).
20 See Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 841 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1987) (rejecting multiple
schemes); United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1381-84 (2d Cir. 1989) (en banc) (rejecting
multiple schemes); Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 39-40 (3d Cir.
1987) (rejecting multiple schemes); International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 154-55
(4th Cir. 1987) (rejecting multiple schemes); R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355
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Court granted certiorari in H.J. Inc. to resolve the divergence of opinion
among the circuits.21
The Court began its analysis by acknowledging that it had asked the
circuits to develop meaningful concepts of pattern in its previous deci-
sion Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 22 Nonetheless, the Court observed that
neither the text nor the legislative history of the RICO statute provided a
basis for the Eighth Circuit's "multiple scheme" requirement. Similarly,
the requirement that a pattern be limited to only "organized crime," (a
limitation repeatedly urged in briefs by Amid), had no support within the
text or legislative history. Rather, analysis of the meaning of pattern
must begin with the text of the statute and follow the ordinary meaning
of the term. A pattern, therefore, is an "arrangement or order of things
or activity." 23
The Court had established in previous cases that the legislative his-
tory requires "continuity plus relationship" in order to demonstrate
"pattern." 24 In H.J. Inc., the Court explained that conduct demonstrates
"relationship" if it "embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar
purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics .... "25 The
second requirement of "pattern," "continuity," is both a closed- and
open-ended concept, referring either to a dosed period of repeated con-
duct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a
threat of repetition." 26 Moreover, the Court provided several examples
to illustrate this "continuity" prong of "pattern." Continuity exists in a
closed period of conduct if it extends over a substantial period of time: a
few weeks or months alone with no threatened future activity are not
substantial. 27 Conversely, the threat of future criminality or repetition
establishes an open-ended continuous "pattern. 28 A scheme by hood-
lums to sell "insurance" to storekeepers is.one example of such a threat
of future criminality. Additionally, "a regular way of conducting defend-
ant's ongoing legitimate business" would similarly establish an open-
ended continuous "pattern." 29
(5th Cir. 1985) (rejecting multiple schemes, two predicate acts enough); United States v. Jennings,
842 F.2d 159, 163 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting multiple schemes); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804
F.2d 970, 975-76 (7th Cir. 1986) -(multiple schemes not the general rule); Superior Oil Co. v.
Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986) (requiring multiple schemes); Sun Says. & Loan Ass'n v.
Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting multiple schemes); Torwest DBC, Inc. v.
Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 928-29 (10th Cir. 1987) (requiring multiple schemes); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust &
Says. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 971 (11th Cir. 1986) (rejecting multiple schemes);
Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 839 F.2d 782, 789 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (requiring related acts that are not isolated events).
21 109 S. Ct. at 2898.
22 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).
23 109 S. Ct. at 2900 (citing XI OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTONARY 357 (2d ed. 1989)).
24 Id at 2900 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 479 U.S. 479,489 (1985); Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16, 26-29 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87, 589-93 (1981)).
25 Id at 2901 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (repealed in 1985)).
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B. Scalia's "Concurrence": "They're out lookin'for Rico... And once
they find 'im, it won't be no banquet Rico gets. .. it'll be a wake. " so
While concurring in the result, Justice Scalia,31 joined by the Chief
Justice, and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, accused the majority of
"vagueness" in attempting to clarify pattern within federal RICO. They
chastised the Court by adding, "[i]t seems to me this increases rather
than removes the vagueness."'8 2 Moreover, they invited a challenge to
RICO on void-for-vagueness grounds33 when they concluded:
No constitutional challenge to this law has been raised in the present
case, and so that issue is not before us. That the highest Court in this
land has been unable to derive from this statute anything more than
today's meager guidance bodes ill for the day when that challenge is
presented.34
30 Lrrrm CAESAR, supra note 1, at 120.
31 Several Court commentators, including Linda Greenhouse for the New York Times, sug-
gested that perhapsJustice Scalia had initially been assigned to write the opinion, but that his "invec-
tive" had been unable to carry a majority of the Court. See Greenhouse, Broad Use of RICO Upheld,
N.Y. Times, Jun. 27, 1989, at 29, col. 4.
32 109 S. Ct. at 2898. The New York Times editorial staff commented on the impropriety of
these, and other comments by the Scalia faction toward the majority. N.Y. Times, July 9, 1989, at
E26, col. 1 ("What's [not] acceptable is the raucous tone and unruly language."). Perhaps Roscoe
Pound put it best when he said, "The opinions of the judge.., are no place for intemperate denun-
ciation of the judge's colleagues, violent invective, attributings of bad motives to the majority of the
court, and insinuations of incompetence, negligence and obtuseness of fellow members of the
court." Pound, Heated Judicial Dissents, 39 A.B.AJ. 795 (1953).
33 See also 58 U.S.L.W. 3099 (Aug. 22, 1989) ("He [Scalia] even suggested that the time may be
ripe for a constitutional challenge to the statute."); 10 RICO L. REP. 5, 6 (1989) ("Justice Scalia
emphasized that the same lack of guidance stemmed from the vagueness of the statute itself. And in
what may have been the most interesting aspect of the Court's opinions, openly suggested that the
next fruitful arena for attack could be based upon that same perceived infirmity..."); Rakoff, Three
Unlikely Cures for Bad Breadth, 10 RICO L. REP. 217 (1989) ('Justice Scalia concludes that RICO quite
possibly could not survive an appropriate constitutional challenge for vagueness."). Further Rakoff
speculated, "[j]oining in Justice Scalia's 'concurrence' were Justices Kennedy and O'Connor and
Chief Justice Rehnquist. The notion that the four most conservative members of the Court are
seemingly prepared to strike down RICO as unconstitutionally vague may come as a rude shock to
those who view any judicial limitation of RICO as an undemocratic exercise of judicial activism."
Accord Razzano, RICO's Death Watch?, 10 RICO L. REP. 223-7 (1989) ("However, Justice Scalia also
candidly conceded that he, himself, would be unable to provide an interpretation of RICO that
would give more guidance than the majority opinion. For this reason, he concluded that the statute
may be unconstitutionally vague.") ("Therefore, Justice Scalia concluded that, in light of the High
Court's very inability to derive from the statute any coherent definition of the term 'pattern of racke-
teering,' future constitutional challenges on grounds of vagueness may well prove successful"). Fur-
thermore, Razzano attempts to distinguish prior holdings of RICO's constitutionality on temporal
(and hence analytical) grounds by noting, "[t]he RICO statute has survived a number of claims that
it is unconstitutionally vague. However, each of those challenges were made before the Supreme
Court's admonition in Sedima's footnote 14 that a 'pattern of racketeering' required proof of more
than two predicate acts .... Because the Supreme Court itself has now demonstrated that it is
unable to formulate such a definition, a constitutional challenge based on the vagueness of this
statutory term may well be possible ... the next meaningful challenge to the statute can only rest
upon vagueness grounds."); Brodsky, Civil RICO And The Definition Of"Pattern", 10 RICO L. REP. 497
(1989) ("Thus, one of the next major battles to be fought over RICO, assuming that the statute is
not amended in the interim, is the vagueness issue that will undoubtedly be raised in many cases
upon Justice Scalia's invitation.").
34 109 S. Ct. at 2909.
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It is not surprising then, that as of this writing, several litigants are
broaching this argument in the lower courts.3 5 To further fuel this fire
many Court observers have latched onto the dissenting opinion in Fort
Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,3 6 in which Justice Stevens, joined by justices
Brennan and Marshall suggested that RICO pattern was unconstitution-
ally vague as applied to state obscenity predicate acts.3 7 These observers
say that perhaps a majority of seven Justices exists that would find pat-
tern unconstitutionally vague.A8 This speculation comes at a time when
the furor over RICO has reached a fevered pitch.
In order to squelch such speculation, this Note will address four ar-
guments. First, it will address the conceptual framework of the void-for-
vagueness doctrine as applied by the Supreme Court. Second, it will
demonstrate that pattern within the RICO statute is not unconstitution-
ally vague. Third, it will dissect the policy choices implicit in Justice
Scalia's argument. Last, this Note will illustrate the catastrophic conse-
quences that holding RICO pattern unconstitutional might produce.
II. Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine: The Conceptual Framework
A. Definitions: "Rico is over here ... That's plain, ain't it? ' 's 9
The starting point for any analysis of vagueness is the definition of
the word vague itself. "Vague" comes from the Latin "vagus," to
35 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) 552 (October 16, 1989) ("The first case to raise questions regarding
the constitutionality of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act in the aftermath of
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.-andJustice Scalia's 'invitation' to defendants to chal-
lenge RICO on constitutional grounds-was dismissed Sept. 11 on alternative grounds by the U.S.
District for Central Illinois (Orchard Hills Cooperative Apartments Inc. v. Germania Federal Savings
and Loan Ass'n, DC C Ill, No. 85-356, 9/1/89)."). This decision was merely a trickle of the out-
pouring yet to come. See 10 RICO L. Rm,. 496 (1989) ("What may become a flood of challenges to
the statute involving the issue of vagueness has already begun. See Supplemental Brief for Appellees,
Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc. The Appellees have asked the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to con-
sider whether, in light of HJ. Inc., RICO's pattern requirement is unconstitutionally vague and
therefore violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." [Busby was
remanded to the lower courts for further consideration without expressly ruling on the merits of the
constitutional challenge]) ("The constitutionality of the statute has also been raised in the same
appellate court in Walk v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., No. 87-3585 (4th Cir.), following the latter's
remand from the Supreme Court."); 5 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) 5 (Dec. 12, 1989) ("In a petition for
Certiorari filed Oct. 28, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to decide... whether RICO is unconsti-
tutionally vague... [Big Apple Industrial Buildings Inc. v. Procter & Gamble, U.S. Sup. Ct., No. 89-
692, Oct. 28, 1989].").
36 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
37 See 10 RICO L. REP. 401 (1989) ("Justice Stevens, dissenting in part and joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, maintained that Indiana's scheme [of RICO 'pattern'] was unconstitutional as
applied to obscenity violations.").
38 See, e.g., Reed, The Defense Case For RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691, 726 (1990) ("Thus, at
least seven Justices have alluded to the potential vagueness problems inherent in RICO's pattern
element."). Most other authors who have discussed whether RICO pattern is void-for-vagueness
have rejected such a contention. See Blakey & Perry, An Analysis of the Myths that Bolster Efforts to
Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God-Is This The End of RICO?", 43
VAND. L. REV. 851, 962-64 n.342 (1990) [hereinafter Myths]; Note, RICO's "Pattern" Requirement: Void
for Vagueness?, 90 COLuM. L. REV. 489 (1990); but see Freeman & McSlarrow, RICO and the Due Process
"Void for Vagueness" Test, 45 Bus. LAw. 1003 (1990).
39 LrrrLE CA~sAR, supra note 1, at 75.
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wander, or "wanderer." 40 With this definition in mind, one might mis-
takenly suggest that if the meaning of a word "wanders," it is vague.
This is not true. A truly vague term has no statutory meaning at all.41
Nevertheless, such a distinction has eluded the lower courts many of
whom have bandied about the terms "ambiguity," "vagueness," and
"overbreadth" interchangeably.
Therefore, to illustrate what "vagueness" is, we must first say what
"vagueness" is not: vagueness is not ambiguity;42 vagueness is not over-
breadth. "Ambiguity" is what its parts imply: two meanings. Thus if a
term may mean one thing in one context, and have another meaning in
another context, it is ambiguous. Obviously, to the extent all statutory
terms are context-specific their meanings are all somewhat ambiguous. 43
The classic illustration of ambiguity is the "Peerless Case," 4 4 where a con-
tract to buy 125 bales of cotton could equally have referred to the first
"Peerless" ship in port in October, or the second "Peerless" ship due in
December. In the words of the court, the contract contained "latent am-
biguity;" the terms of the contract could refer to either "Peerless." Of
course, in the case of a statute, this ambiguity can easily be rectified by
explicitly defining the terms to determine the intended reach of the
statute.
4 5
"Overbreadth" similarly means exactly what its word parts imply: a
term that is overly broad. Thus if it is desired only to prohibit a's behav-
ior, but b's behavior also falls within the ambit of the statute's terms, the
statute suffers from "overbreadth." The overbreadth doctrine has tradi-
tionally been confined to the free speech area.4 6 This is so because
"overbreadth" implies a judicial exception to all doctrines of standing
and justiciability. Only in the free speech area may a's claim rest on the
justiciability of b's hypothetical claim. Even though a statute may be both
"overbroad" and "vague" in the First Amendment context, this is not
40 XIX THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 396 (2d ed. 1989). Vague is defined as "[c]ouched in
general or indefinite terms; not definitely or precisely expressed; deficient in details or particulars"
and "[n]ot precise or exact in meaning." Id.
41 See T. MACUALAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OFJAMES THE SECOND xix IV
303 (1855) ("A motion was made so vaguely worded that it could hardly be said to mean any-
thing."). Similarly, the Supreme Court bemoaned in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 414 (1819), "[sluch is the character of the human language, that no word conveys to the mind,
in all situations, one single definite idea .. " Critics of RICO pattern could similarly rely on history
for the proposition that "[viague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse of language, have so
long passed for mysteries of science." J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
(1690). Conversely, those who view Scalia's concurrence as mere invective might cite to history by
noting, "[mien often extenuate their own guilt, only by vague and general charges upon others." S.
JOHNSON, RAMBLER No. 76 Par. 8 (1750). Regardless of their position in this debate, all should
recognize that "[plure vagueness of speech abounds." R.H. HORNE, A NEw SPIRIT OF THE AGE 436
(1849).
42 R. DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 39 (1986) ("Whereas 'ambiguity' in its
classical sense refers to equivocation, 'vagueness' refers to the degree to which, independent of
equivocation, language is uncertain in its respective application to a number of particulars.")
43 See C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 14 (1960) ("Many ordinary statutes-most of them,
perhaps-bristle with hard interpretive problems.").
44 Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864).
45 Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 91 (1960).
46 For a scholarly analysis of the doctrine, see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARv. L. REv. 844, 918 (1970).
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necessarily so-a statute may be quite specific (thus not vague) while en-
compassing "overly broad" behavior.4 7 Moreover, outside of the first
amendment context "overbreadth" loses its rationale of chilling
speech.48
Thus, the concepts of "ambiguity" and "overbreadth" are judicial
creatures that are quite distinct from the doctrine of "vagueness." A
proper analysis the void-for-vagueness doctrine must, necessarily, recog-
nize these as separate doctrines. Only one of them is truly applicable.4 9
B. Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court: "Cheatin'
yourself at solitaire. "50
Since 1926 a series of cases in the Supreme Court has defined the
contours of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.51 In his seminal piece The
47 G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALU ON CONsTITUTONAL LAw 1134 n.5 (1976). ("An 'over-
breadth' challenge should not be confused with one on grounds of'vagueness,' though a challenger
will often assert both grounds of invalidity. An unconstitutionally vague statute, like an overbroad
one, creates 'chilling effect' risks to protected speech. But a statute can be quite specific-i.e., not
'vague'--and yet be overly broad.").
48 For the difference between "vagueness" and "overbreadth" as described by the Supreme
Court, see Zwiclder v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 256 (1967) (Justice Brennan noted that a statute is vague
when it "either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily question its meaning and differ. as to its application" whereas over-
breadth is a concern when "the statute, although lacking neither clarity nor precision is void ...
[because] it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms").
49 For a conceptual discussion of vagueness and the related evils of ambiguity and overbreadth,
see Aigler, Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 MiCH. L. REv. 831 (1923); Christie, Vagueness and
Legal Language, 48 MINN. L. REv. 885 (1964); Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty--An Appraisal, 40
CORNEL L.Q. 195 (1955); Freund, The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes, 30 YALE L.J. 437 (1921);
Jefflies, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. Rzv. 189 (1985); Williams,
Language and the Law (pts. 1-4), 61 L. Q. REv. 71, 179, 293, 384 (1945), (pt. 5), 62 L. 0. REv. 387
(1946); Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HARv. L. REv. 77 (1948); Note,
Constitutional Law, Void for Vagueness: An Escape from Statutory Interpretation, 23 IND. LJ. 272 (1948);
Comment, Legislation-Requirement of Statutory Definiteness in Statutory Standards, 53 MicH L. REv. 264
(1954).
50 LrrrLE CAzs~A, supra note 1, at 177 n.22.
51 The void-for-vagueness doctrine is a uniquely American construct. Although some authors
suggested it was a variant of the English common law canon requiring strict construction of criminal
statutes, the void-for-vagueness doctrine had entirely different beginnings. The genesis of the doc-
trine may be traced to pre-Civil War 19th Century state courts which held vague legislative com-
mands to be inoperative. The earliest case was Drake v. Drake, 15 N.C. 110 (1833). The North
Carolina Supreme Court stated "[w]hether a statute be a public or a private one, if the terms in
which it is couched be so vague as to convey no definite meaning to those whose duty it is to execute
it, either ministerially orjudicially, it is necessarily inoperative [not unconstitutional, only inopera-
tive]." Id. at 115-16. As the volume of such state cases grew, the U.S. Supreme Court took hotice,
and while skirting the issue directly, ChiefJustice Waite said in dictum "if the legislature undertakes
to define by statute a new offense, and provide for its punishment, it should express its will in lan-
guage that need not deceive the common mind." United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220 (1876).
The first federal judge to hold a statute inoperative because of vagueness was Justice Brewer in
Chicago N.W. Ry. v. Dey, 35 Fed. 866, 876 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1888) who said, "no penal law can be
sustained unless its mandates are so clearly expressed that any ordinary person can determine in
advance what he may and what he may not do under it." It'must be remembered that the doctrine
still did not command constitutional significance, only a functional invalidation. The first Supreme
Court decision to accord the doctrine constitutional dimension was Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas,
212 U.S. 86, 108 (1909). Both litigants briefed and argued the issue of whether the Texas anti-trust
laws were "so vague, indefinite, and uncertain as to deprive them [the laws] of their constitutionality
[under the fourteenth amendment]." Id. Nonetheless, the statutes in Waters-Pierce Oil were upheld
as sufficiently definite. The first case where a statute was invalidated as unconstitutionally vague was
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Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,5 2 then student, Anthony
Amsterdam analyzed these decisions through 1960. Since the Court has
cited Professor Amsterdam more than a dozen times following, the initial
guidance for any scholarly analysis of the doctrine, must ultimately follow
Professor Amsterdam.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine draws its sustenance and power
from the due process fair-warning provisions of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 53 Implicit within the void-for-vagueness doctrine is also a
notion that article III separation of powers commands the courts to inval-
idate improperly framed legislation. 54 Mistakenly, the Court has even
suggested that the doctrine may rely on the sixth amendment 55 for ana-
lytic support. Given a standard of Constitutional dimension, and a back-
drop of nearly one hundred cases where the Court has applied the void-
for-vagueness doctrine, what principles can we apply to modem constitu-
tional challenges? Moreover, how do these principles apply to the as-
sault on RICO "pattern?"
1. Vagueness Standards: The Twin Aims
"A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process . . ." This component of due process from the oft-quoted
Connally v. General Construction Co. 56 is fair warning. 57 The second due
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914), and its companion case Collins v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634 (1914). Thus a state statute that required a company to "guess at its peril"
was held void-for-vagueness and violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth amendment
because the law as construed offered no standard of conduct that was possible to know. This is the
modem constitutional doctrine from which to proceed in our analysis.
52 Note, supra note 45, at 90.
53 For a colorful opposing opinion see Case Note, Constitutional Law - Vagueness in the Defintion of
a Crime, 7 ARK. L. REv. 135, 137 (1953) ("But the armour [due process foundation of void-for vague-
ness] is debased by a shotgun wad of quotations from various cases and other more dubious authori-
ties that cover practically the full range of possible constitutional objections to a vague statute.").
54 The notion operative here was that the statute violated separation of powers by passing Con-
gress'job to thejudiciary. SeeJames v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S.
82 (1879); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875). Of course, this notion was operative long
before the void-for-vagueness doctrine was formulated. The English Privy Council voided colonial
laws "because they were carelessly written or so garbled to be absurd." L. FREEMAN, A HisToRY OF
AMERICAN LAW 44 (1973). See also Drake v. Drake, 15 N.C. 110 (1833). The Supreme Court has on
occasion explicitly addressed this rationale for the void-for-vagueness doctrine. See United States v.
Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 486, 495 (1948) ("But strong as the presumption of validity may be, there are
limits beyond which we cannot go in finding what Congress has not put into so many words or in
making certain what it has left undefined or too vague for reasonable assurance of its meaning. In
our system, so far at least as concerns the federal powers, defining crimes and fixing penalties are
legislative, notjudicial functions."). See also Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 113 (1979) ("Thus
to ensure that a legislature speaks with special clarity when making the boundaries of criminal con-
duct, courts must decline to impose punishment for actions that are not 'plainly and unmistakably'
proscribed."); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971) ("[B]ecause of the seriousness of
criminal penalties, and because punishment usually represents moral condemnation of the commu-
nity, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity. This policy embodies the 'instinctive
distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should.' ").
55 Most notably in United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 225 U.S. 81, 89 (1921).
56 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1925).
57 The Roman Emperor Caligula (37-41 A.D.) posted his laws in fine print atop the highest
pillars of the Forum so that they would be read by as few as possible. Dio's Roman History 357 (E.
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process essential implicated by vague statutes is the requirement that
standards of enforcement be sufficiently precise that they avoid "involv-
ing so many factors of varying effect that whether the person to decide in
advance nor the jury after the fact can safely and certainly judge the re-
sult."58 The twin essentials, or aims, of the void-for-vagueness doc-
trine59 as a command of due process are thus (1) fair warning to the
potential offender, and (2) precise standards to guide the judge and jury
in ascertaining the offense. 60
Cary trans. 1924). See also United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952) ("Words which are
vague... may be as much of a trap for the innocent as the ancient laws of Caligula."); A. CAmus,
CALGULA AND THREE OTHER PLAYS 165 (S. Gilbert trans. 1962) ("The less these people understand,
the better they'll behave."). Justice Douglas noted in Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814,
823 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting):
Caligula's practice... [was] printing the laws in small print and placing them so high on a
wall that the ordinary man did not receive fair warning. 'When taxes of this kind have been
proclaimed, but not published in writing, in as much as many offenses were committed
through ignorance of the letter of the law, he at last, on the urgent demand of the people,
had the law posted up, but in a very narrow place, and in excessively small letters, to pre-
vent the making of a copy. ' SuaErONIUS, THE LIvEs OF THE TWELVE CAESARS 192 (Modern
Lib. ed. 1931).
In a very real sense, this was to thwart the provision of fair warning to Roman Citizens. Rather than
constitutional due process, analytically, the concept of fair warning, and ultimately the void-for-
vagueness doctrine, is grounded in the Principle of Legality. As Professor Hall has elegantly argued
for over 40 years, the Principle of Legality had its antecedent in Roman Law. J. HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 28-30 (2d ed. 1960). Interestingly, ProfessorJeffries supra note 49, can
be read to imply that the Principle of Legality was as much ajurisprudential outgrowth of the need to
provide foundation for the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the strict construction of criminal stat-
utes. This may be overstating ProfessorJeffiries case, however, because the early void-for-vagueness
cases demonstrated ajudiciary more willing to premise the doctrine on broader notions: separation
of powers, or invalid delegation of legislative function. The Courts were implicitly stating, "[n]o
Legislative crime, no punishment." This is by no means divergent from the Roman maxim "[n]ulla
poena sine ege" [no punishment without law]. Nonetheless, ProfessorJeffries' work is invaluable to a
proper understanding of the theoretical basis of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
58 Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 (1927).
59 See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) ("It is a basic principle of
due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its provision are not clearly defined. Vague
laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the
innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissi-
bly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and
subjective basis, with the attendant damages of arbitrary and discriminatory application."). An elo-
quent description of the rationales behind these two prongs of the void-for-vagueness doctrine can
be found in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984) ("The requirement that
government articulate its aims with a reasonable degree of clarity assures that state power will be
exercised only on behalf of policies reflecting an authoritative choice among competing social val-
ues, reduces the danger of caprice and discrimination in the administration of the laws, enables
individuals to conform their conduct to the requirements of law, and permits meaningful judicial
review.").
60 The Court has, from time to time, expressed a preference for one of the prongs over the
other, see, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) ("Although the doctrine focuses both
on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more
important aspect of vagueness doctrine 'is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the
doctrine-the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforce-
ment.' Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit
'a standardless sweep (that) allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predi-
lections.' "). Nevertheless, to the extent that either prong is not met the statute will be held uncon-
stitutionally vague.
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2. Bill of Rights Buffer Zone
Professor Amsterdam's central thesis is that "the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional indefiniteness has been used by the Supreme Court almost in-
variably for the creation of an insulating buffer zone of added protection
at the peripheries of several of the Bill of Rights freedoms." 6' This
buffer zone was originally extended to protect property rights under the
commerce power. Since the New Deal, the buffer zone has been ex-
tended to protect free speech in the first amendment context, and civil
rights in the equal protection context. Indeed, a perusal of the more
than seventy cases since 1960 citing the void-for-vagueness doctrine
bears out this observation. Many of the cases implicated privacy free-
doms: abortion,6 2 obscenity,63 censorshipS; or civil rights: anti-picket-
61 Note, supra note 45, at 75.
62 Vagueness challenges in the abortion context are subject to a stricter standard, since the
mother's right to an abortion is a constitutionally fundamental right. See Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 769 n.14 (1986) ("We agree with the Court
of Appeals [that the adverb 'siguificantly' modified the risk imposed on the woman] and therefore
find the statute to be facially invalid... This makes it unnecessary for us to consider appellee's
further argument that section 3210(b) is void for vagueness."); City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 451 (1983) ("Section 1870.16 of the Akron ordinance re-
quires physicians performing abortions to 'insure that the remains of the unborn child are disposed
of in a humane and sanitary manner.' . . . The phrase 'humane and sanitary' does . . . suggest a
possible intent to mandate some sort of 'decent burial' of an embryo at the earliest stages of forma-
tion. This level of uncertainty is fatal where criminal liability is imposed. Because Section 1870.16
fails to give a physician 'fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden' we agree that it
violates the due process clause.") (citations omitted); Planned Parenthood Assoc., Inc. v. Ashcroft,
462 U.S. 476, 492 (1983) ("Plaintiffs argue that the word 'emancipated' in this context is void for
vagueness, but we disagree. Although the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the
facts and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri Courts have adopted general rules to
guide that determination, and the term is one of general usage and understanding in the Missouri
common law.") (citations omitted); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 311 (1980) (the Hyde Amend-
ment is not unconstitutionally void-for-vagueness insofar as physicians are able to understand and
implement the exceptions under which abortions are reimbursable); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379, 390 (1979); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1973) (The phrase "best clinical judgment
that an abortion is necessary" is not unconstitutionally void-for-vagueness); United States v. Vuitch,
402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971) ("Under such law which prohibits abortion unless necessary for the preserva-
tion of the mother's life or health . . . 'We therefore hold that properly construed the District of
Columbia abortion law is not unconstitutionally vague . . .'") ("The requirement of a narrowly
drawn statute when the regulation touches a protected constitutional right (Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 100) is only another facet of the void-for-vagueness
problem.").
63 Fort Wayne Books Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916, 925 (1989) ("Given that the RICO statute
totally encompasses the obscenity law, if the latter is not unconstitutionally vague, the former cannot
be vague either."); Trinkler v. Alabama, 414 U.S. 955, 956 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("[Olbscene publications, so adjudged by the application of community standards that the publica-
tions were patently offensive and lacked serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value, should
have been found not obscene based on the void for vagueness unconstitutionality of such a commu-
nity standard"). This view by the liberal minority of the Court was similarly expressed in three
famous obscenity cases. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 43 n.7 (1973) ("Ifa specific book, play,
paper or motion picture has in a civil proceeding been condemned as obscene and review of that
finding has been completed, and thereafter a person publishes shows or displays that particular book
or film, then a vague law has been made specific."); Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 86
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The vagueness of the standards in the obscenity area produces a
number of separate problems, and any improvement must rest on an understanding that the
problems are to some extent distinct. First, a vague statute fails to provide adequate notice to per-
sons who are engaged in the type of conduct that the statute could be thought to proscribe. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that all criminal laws provide fair notice
of 'what the State commands or forbids.' In the service of this general principle we have repeatedly
held that the definition of obscenity must provide adequate notice of exactly what is prohibited from
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ing ordinances, 65 trespass, 66 vagrancy, 67 discrimination. 68  Other cases
address the more traditional free speech 69 concerns. City ordinances 70
dissemination. While various tests have been upheld under the Due Process Clause ... I have grave
doubts any of these tests could be sustained [today].") (citations omitted); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 643 (1969) (Douglas,J., dissenting) (The fact that definition of "knowingly" in statute
prohibiting sale to minors under age of 17 of obscene materials harmful to them encompassed hav-
ing reason to know or believe or grounds for belief warranting further inspection or inquiry as to
character and content of material and age of minor did not render statute void-for-vagueness.).
64 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 684-85 (1968) ("[R]estrictions imposed
cannot be so vague as to set 'the censor ... adrift upon a boundless sea'."); Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965) (motion picture censorship).
65 Cameron v.Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (Mississippi anti-picketing law prohibiting picketing
which obstructs or unreasonably interferes with free ingress or egress to and from public buildings
and property is not void-for-vagueness.); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (Even
though substantial constitutional questions could be raised in view of the generality of the language
contained in city parade ordinance and vagueness of temporary injunction restraining petitioners
from participating in or encouraging mass street parades or processions without a permit as required
by the ordinance, petitioners who did not attempt to have injunction dissolved or modified or to
secure parade permit and who deliberately violated injunction with expectation of going to jail were
not entitled to have the constitutional issues considered and were properly convicted of criminal
contempt.); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559, 567 (1965) ("Appellant was convicted for demonstrating not 'in' but 'near' the courthouse...
The question is raised as to whether the failure of the statute to define the word 'near' renders it
unconstitutionally vague... It is dear that there is some lack of specificity in a word such as 'near'
... this lack of specificity may not render the statute unconstitutionally vague, at least as applied to
the demonstration within the sight and hearing of those in the courthouse.") (citations omitted).
66 Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 42 (1966) ("Petitioners seem to argue that the Florida tres-
pass law is void for vagueness because it requires a trespass to be 'with a malicious and mischievous
intent' . . . The Florida trespass statute... cannot be challenged on this ground. It is aimed at
conduct of one limited kind, that is, for one person or persons to trespass on the property of another
with a malicious and mischievous intent. There is no lack of notice in this law, nothing to entrap or
fool the unwary."). Compare a triumvirate of cases during the 1964 term in which the Court
weighed the competing values of property owners to trespass statutes, the right of negroes to protest
"Apartheid" and the vagueness that inhered in those trespass statutes. See Bouie v. City of Colum-
bia, 378 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1964) (retroactive and unexpected construction of the South Carolina
trespass statute by the South Carolina Supreme Court was constitutionally void-for-vagueness and
fundamentally violated notions of fair-warning); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 325 (1964) (Major-
ity does not reach Constitutionality) (Black,J., dissenting) ("We reject the contention that the statute
as construed is void for vagueness.... [W]e do not doubt that one purpose of these 'sit-ins' was to
express a vigorous protest against Hooper's policy of not serving Negroes. But it is wholly dear that
the Maryland statute here is directed not against what petitioners said but against what they did-
remaining on the premises of another after having been warned to leave, conduct which States have
traditionally prohibited in this country. And none of our prior cases has held that a person's right to
freedom of expression carries with it a right to force a private owner to furnish his property as a
platform to criticize the property owner's use of that property."); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S.
146, 151 n.6 (1964) (Prosecutions for trespass and breach of peace against negroes who sat, waiting
for service at lunch counter were reversed) ("We do not reach petitioner's contention that their
breach-of-peace convictions were void for vagueness under the doctrine of Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451 (1939).").
67 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 162 (1972).
68 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984) (Minnesota Human Rights Act,
which forbids discrimination on the basis of sex in "places of public accommodation," was applied to
Jaycees by ordering them to admit women to its local chapters in Minnesota. The Court found that
Act was not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 785
(1966); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 466 (1963).
69 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1967) (overbreadth of New York law limiting the
distribution of anonymous handbills distinguished from void-for-vagueness challenge); Giaccio v.
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966) (Pennsylvania statute authorizing jury to impose cost of criminal
prosecution on defendant acquitted of misdemeanor charge is violative of due process because of
vagueness and absence of any standards sufficient to enable defendants to protect themselves
against arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of costs.); Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965
(1983), (Brennan,J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("The concern with arbitrary encroachments on
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have been attacked for vagueness on a variety of fronts. Communists71
and subversives have been singled out for this "buffer zone" protection.
Aliens72 have also been the center of controversy involving the doctrine.
Analytically, the first amendment and due process freedoms of the early
20th century have blossomed into the freedoms of expression, marriage
and procreation, and locomotion.73
3. Civil Statutes Definite
But these seventy cases merely assert or discuss constitutional
vagueness challenges. These cases belie the fact that since 1960 only a
dozen statutes have been held void-for-vagueness by the Supreme Court.
Of these, fully half of the statutes were facially unconstitutional as vague
freedom which underlies the notice requirement naturally has special force when the liberty interests
at stake are fundamental. For this reason, we have demanded greater precision in laws which render
conduct criminal or which may abridge First Amendment rights.").
70 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982) (Vil-
lage ordinance which required retailer to obtain license if it sold items, effects, paraphernalia or
accessories designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs was sufficiently clear that the
speculative danger of arbitrary enforcement did not render it void-for-vagueness.); City of Mesquite
v. Alladin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982), rev'd in part, 464 U.S. 927 (1983) (section of city licens-
ing ordinance governing coin-operated amusement establishments and directing police chief to con-
sider whether license applicant has "any connections with criminal elements" is not
unconstitutionally vague.); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 107 (1972) (Held that city
antinoise ordinance prohibiting a person while on grounds adjacent to a building in which a school
is in session from willfully making a noise or diversion that disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or
good order of the school session is not unconstitutionally vague.).
71 Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 684 (1972) (Requirement that employees of Common-
wealth of Massachusetts subscribe to oath that they will uphold and defend Constitution of the
United States and Constitution of Commonwealth and that they will oppose the overthrow of gov-
ernment of United States by force, violence or illegal unconstitutional method is not void-for-vague-
ness.); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (New York anarchy statute was allegedly void-for-
vagueness in violation of due process.); Dombroski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Albertson v.
Millard, 345 U.S. 242, 243 (1953) ("These definitions are challenged by the appellants as void for
vagueness. The definition of a Communist as ... a member of the communist party, notwithstand-
ing the facts that he may not pay dues to, or hold a card in, said party.., is said to be vague since
once dues and cards are eliminated as criteria there are no readily apparent means of determining
who is a member ... It is contended there are no standards as to what is a satellite.").
72 United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987) (discusses vagueness argument); Bouti-
lier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967) (The statute under which deportation order issued provided for
no warning to alien who was homosexual at time of first entry into United States that he was then
subject to exclusion, did not render statute void-for-vagueness) ("It is true that this Court has held
the 'void for vagueness' doctrine applicable to civil as well as criminal actions. See Small Co. v.
American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925). Nevertheless, this is where 'the exaction of
obedience to a rule or standard.., was so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at
all ..."); United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169 (1952) (Defendant was indicted for violations of
Internal Security Act which didn't indicate to whom, and for what, the alien should apply, and was
therefore found unconstitutional.) ("But the present statute, in my judgment, entangles aliens in a
snare of vagueness from which few can escape. I think the Constitution requires more than a 'bad
guess' to make a criminal."); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (The statute relating to
deportation of alien sentenced more than once because of conviction of crime involving 'moral tur-
pitude' would be tested under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, notwithstanding that statute was not
criminal statute, in view of grave nature of deportation).
73 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 209-12 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("First is the autono-
mous control over the development of one's intellect, interests, tastes and personality... Second is
freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, con-
traception, and the eduction and upbringing of children ... Third is the freedom to care for one's
health and person, freedom from bodily restraint or compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf.").
[Vol. 65:1106
regulations of first amendment rights.7 4 Two other statutes were found
void-for-vagueness because they abridged a mother's fundamental pri-
vacy right to an abortion.75 Three other statutes were exclusively crimi-
nal in scope, regulating the crimes of vagrancy,7 6 and communist
activity. 77 RICO conversely, contemplates the regulation of neither first
amendment liberties nor fundamental privacy rights. Moreover, only
74 Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Smith v. Gougen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (lack
of ascertainable standards for "treating contemptuously" the American flag) ("Where a statutes'
literal scope.., is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the doctrine
[void-for-vagueness] demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts."); Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 685 (1968) (An ordinance providing for classification of
films as suitable for young persons or not suitable for young persons, and in defining unsuitable
class, using standards depending upon individual censors, was invalid for want of narrowly drawn
standards, and void-for-vagueness) ("Thus to the extent that vague standards do not sufficiently
guide the censor, the problem is not cured merely by affording de novo judicial review. Vague
standards, unless narrowed by interpretation, encourage erratic administration whether the censor
be administrative or judicial: 'individual impressions become the yardstick of action, and result in
regulation in accordance with the beliefs of the individual censor rather than regulation by law.' ");
Keyshian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) (N.Y. Teachers Oath which inquired
"whether he had advocated or been a member of a group which advocated forceful overthrow of the
government" constitutionally void-for-vagueness) ("The danger of that chilling effect upon the exer-
cise of vital First Amendment rights must be guarded against by sensitive tools which clearly inform
teachers what is being proscribed."); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965)
("Literally read, therefore, the second part of this ordinance says that a person may stand on public
sidewalks in Birmingham only at the whim of any police officer of that city. The constitutional vice of
so broad a provision needs no demonstration."); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351-52
(1964) (South Carolina Supreme Court in applying its 1961 construction of statute prohibiting entry
on lands of another after notice not to enter, to affirm convictions of negroes who in 1960 refused to
leave booth in luncheonette department of drugstore after request to leave deprived negroes of
liberty and property without due process of law.) ("The thrust of the distinction, however, is to
produce a potentially created deprivation of their right to fair notice in this sort of case, where the
claim is that a statute precise on its face has been unforseeably and retroactively expanded byjudicial
construction, than in the typical 'void for vagueness' situation.... There can be no doubt that a
deprivation of the right of fair warning can result not only from vague statutory language but also
from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory lan-
guage."); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963) ("[S]tandards of permissible statutory
vagueness are strict in the area of free expression... Because First Amendment freedoms need
breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.").
75 City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 474 (1983); Co-
lautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-91 (1979) (Pennsylvania Abortion, Control Act imposing stan-
dard of care on persons for performing abortion where such person determines that the fetus "is
viable", or there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus "may be viable" is impermissibly vague
both with respect to the viability determination requirement and the stated standard of care.) ("This
[void-for-vagueness] appears to be especially true where the uncertainty induced by the statute
threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.").
76 Kolenderv. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,357 (1983) (California statute requiring persons who loiter
or wander on the streets to provide a "credible and reliable" identification when requested by a
police officer was held unconstitutionally vague by failing to clarify what was contemplated by the
requirement that a suspect provide a "credible and reliable" identification.); Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (Vagrancy ordinance containing the archaic classifications of
vagrancy laws held void-for-vagueness because it failed to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice that his contemplated conduct was forbidden, it encouraged arbitrary and erratic arrests and
convictions, made criminal those activities which by modern standards are normally innocent and
placed almost unfettered discretion in the hands of the police) ("This ordinance is void for vague-
ness, both in the sense that it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his con-
templated conduct is forbidden by statute, and because it encourages arbitrary arrests and
convictions.") (citations omitted).
77 Dombroski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (provision of Louisiana Subversive Activities and
Communist Control Law defining "subversive organization" violated due process in that language
was unduly vague, uncertain and broad.).
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one of the twelve cases invalidated a civil statute 78-the very defect
RICO opponents accuse the RICO statute of.
Indeed, with the exception of Giaccio v. Pennsylvania 79 no civil statute,
before 1966 nor afterward, has been found unconstitutionally void-for-
vagueness. Giaccio, however, was so clearly void-for-vagueness that there
could be no possible application of its holding to the factual instance of a
RICO "pattern." In Giaccio, the Pennsylvania statute directed that "in all
cases of acquittals by the petit jury . . . the jury trying the same shall
determine . . .whether the county . . .or the defendant shall pay the
costs."80 There were "no standards at all, nor d[id] it place any condi-
tions of any kind upon the jury's power." 8' Thus the Pennsylvania stat-
ute openly transgressed the second prong of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine because it "le[ft] ... jurors free to decide, without any legally
fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular
case."8 2 RICO, conversely, has clearly enumerated predicate acts that
constitute a "pattern." The judge or jury may not "invent" a pattern
based upon their discretion. As such, Giaccio will likely have no prece-
dential value for any vagueness cases, as few statutes could ever conceiv-
ably grant a jury such wide ambit. Civil statutes will remain
presumptively definite.
4. Line-Drawing
As Professor Amsterdam pointed out, demonstrating vagueness ne-
cessitates line-drawing.83 Justice Holmes similarly commented that
"[t]he law is full of instances when a man's fate depends on his estimat-
ing rightly, that is as the jury subsequendy estimates it, some matter of
degree."'8 4 Line-drawing is of course endemic to the function of law: to
apportion blame or damages in some cases, and not in others. Thus
merely because pattern requires some line-drawing distinctions is not fa-
78 Giaccio v. State of Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966) (Pennsylvania statute authorizing
jury to impose cost of criminal prosecution on defendant acquitted of misdemeanor charge violated
due process because of vagueness and absence of any standards sufficient to enable defendants to
protect themselves against arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of costs.) ("Certainly one of the
basic purposes of the Due Process Clause has always been to protect a person against having the
Government impose burdens upon him except in accordance with the valid laws of the land. Implicit
in this constitutional safeguard is the premise that the law must be one that carries an understanda-
ble meaning with legal standards that courts must enforce. This State Act as written does not even
begin to meet this constitutional requirement.").
79 Id.
80 Id. at 400-01 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1222 (Purdon 1939)).
81 Id. at 403.
82 Id. at 402-03.
83 Frederick Schauer eloquently discussed this ancient legal problem in his piece Slippery Slopes,
99 HARV. L. REv. 361, 380 (1985) ("That we are on occasion forced to specify relatively arbitrary
lines does not mean that the lines, once specified, are linguistically imprecise. A line that is deter-
mined 'arbitrarily' rather than tracking some natural division of the world need not be less precise
than any other kind of line, and is often more precise."). Schauer continued in a footnote which
could not possibly be improved upon, "The classic response is, not unexpectedly, from Holmes.
'[W]here to draw the line.. .is the question in pretty much everything worth arguing in law.' Irwin v.
Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 168 (1925). But in my mind the best rejoinder to those who have trouble with
line-drawing is the comment ofJohn Lowenstein of the Baltimore Orioles: 'They should move first
base back a step to eliminate all the close plays.' " Id. at 380 n.52 (citation omitted).
84 Nash v. U.S., 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1923).
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tal to its operation. As Lord Nottingham stated in the Duke of Norfolk's
Case two hundred years ago, "I will stop where-eyer any visible Incon-
venience doth appear."8 5 In this case the legislative history makes it
clear that "[i]nconvenience doth appear" where two predicate acts of
racketeering activity evidencing "continuity plus relationship" are
demonstrated. Justice Scalia does not quibble with instances of at least
two acts of racketeering activity which do not evidence "continuity plus
relationship." Nor does he categorically analyze the majority's examples
and guidelines of continuity plus relationship. What irks Justice Scalia is
that he must draw the line. Yet, as Justice Holmes suggested, that is es-
sentially the primary command of the legal process.8 6
Another complaint of line-drawing is that it does not normatively say
what pattern is. To sustain a statute by analogy, to say it is "as definite
as" an earlier statute, is "singularly unilluminating." Indeed, Justice
Brennan used "as definite as" analysis when he provided examples that
constituted continuity plus relationship and therefore demonstrated a
"pattern."8 7
But this criticism ignores the fundamental linguistic content, or lack
thereof, used in all statutory terms. Professor Freund argued that statu-
tory terms are comprised of three grades: precisely measured terms, ab-
stractions of common certainty, and terms involving an appeal to
judgment or a question of degree.88 Precisely measured terms are never
challenged on vagueness grounds (and rarely found). Terms which in-
volve a question of degree comprise the majority of vagueness chal-
lenges. "Reasonable" rates,8 9 "restraint" of trade,90 "unneeded"
employees, 9 1 "near" a forest,92 "political" purposes,95 "ordinary" fees,94
and "undesirable" residents95 all require the defendant and the jury to
assess the term, make a value judgment, and draw the line. Professor
Amsterdam affectionately labelled this perplexing class of terms "phrases
of inherent discontrol." 96
"Pattern," however, falls squarely within the middle grade of profes-
sor Freund's classifications: abstractions of common certainty. Amster-
dam explains that these terms are commonly ascertainable because their
meaning may be affixed by an external object-referent. Words which re-
fer to external objects may be ambiguous, but once defined, never vague.
This external semantic reference is critical, for it is the key mechanism by
which all the United States district courts and circuit courts of appeal
have found RICO pattern constitutionally definite.97 Pattern does not
85 Howard v. Norfolk, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682).
86 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
87 109 S. Ct. at 2902, see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
88 Freund, The Use of Indefinite Terns in Statutes, 30 YALE L.J, 437 (1921).
89 Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Dey, 35 Fed. 866 (Brewer, Circuit Judge, 1888).
90 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
91 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947).
92 United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927).
93 United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930).
94 Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1 (1938).
95 Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
96 Note, supra note 45, at 93.
97 See infra notes 165-227 and accompanying text.
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stand alone within the statute; rather, a "pattern of racketeering activity"
is prohibited. This "racketeering activity" is statutorily enumerated in
the form of predicate offenses. It was this "external" or "contextual"
reference that the Supreme Court itself said was determinative in ascer-
taining pattern in Fort Wayne Books. 98
5. Scienter
Inherent in vagueness doctrine is a requirement of "scienter." Of
the statutes that have independent scienter, or mens rea requirements,
none have been found unconstitutionally void-for-vagueness. 99 Of
course since RICO pattern is composed of predicate racketeering act
statutes with independent scienter requirements of their own, it begs the
question: Is fair warning satisfied by "racketeering act" scienter, pattern
scienter, or both? First, does RICO have an independent state-of-mind
requirement apart from that of the predicate offenses? The circuits are
split. The Second Circuit has chosen to follow the Scotto 100 line of cases
where no separate state of mind requirement is read into "pattern of
racketeering activity." The Seventh Circuit held in United States v. Mel-
ton 101 that "pattern of racketeering activity" requires a state of mind,
while the Eighth Circuit has expressed "grave doubts as to the propriety
of these [Scotto] holdings." 10 2 The Supreme.Court should hold, accord-
ing to United States v. Bailey,103 that absent legislative intent, scienter
should only be read into common law offenses, not regulatory offenses.
Considering RICO's severe penalties-twenty years and $250,000 fine
maximum-as well as the fact that a pattern must be composed of com-
mon law predicates, the better reasoned position would require an in-
dependent pattern scienter.
Second, the "racketeering activity" predicate acts overwhelmingly
require scienter showings. Federal mail and wire fraud predicates draw
most of the fire from critics, 10 4 yet Durland v. United States 105 established
98 Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
99 See Note, supra note 45, at 86 n.98, for a review of the cases through 1960. See Collings, supra
note 49, at 227. See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) ("[Ihe Hyde Amendment is not void
for vagueness because (1) the sanction provision in the Medicaid Act contains a clear scienter re-
quirement under which good faith errors are not penalized"); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966) ("[The Court holds a stringent scienter requirement saves § 241 from condemnation as a
criminal statute failing to provide adequate notice of the proscribed conduct."); Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979) ("This Court has long recognized that the constitutionality of a vague
statutory standard is closely related to whether the standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea.
See, e.g., United States v. Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422, 434-46 (1978); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405
U.S.at 163; Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952). Because of the absence of
a scienter requirement in the provision directing the physician to determine whether the fetus is or
may be viable, the statute is little more than a 'trap for those who act in good faith.' United States v.
Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942)."); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-02 (1945) (plurality
opinion) ("[T]he requirement of a specific intent to do a prohibited act may avoid those conse-
quences to the accused which may otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute invalid.").
100 United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1980) (no separate state-of-mind), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
101 689 F.2d 679, 684-85, 687 (7th Cir. 1982) (state of mind required).
102 United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 661 (8th Cir. 1981).
103 444 U.S. 393, 402-09 (1980).
104 See, e.g., 9 RICO L. REP. 923 (1989) (ChiefJustice Rehnquist criticized the expansion of mail
and wire fraud through the use of the RICO statute). For a general discussion of the historical
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conclusively that "good faith" is a complete defense against such stat-
utes. An "intent to defraud" is necessary to sustain convictions under
these federal fraud statutes-an independent scienter requirement.
Moreover, this "intent to defraud" or "scheme to defraud" provides
"specific intent"-a level of scienter arguably not required by the prevail-
ing Supreme Court jurisprudence in Screws v. United States.106 Neverthe-
less, should we find Justice Jackson's dissent in Screws more compelling
(many commentators including professor Amsterdam do), the requisite
intent to both cause the act and to perpetrate a knowingly "unlawful
fraud" would be found.
The other predicate racketeering acts similarly require scienter in
order to sustain conviction. For instance, in the leading securities
fraud 10 7 case of Dirks v. SEC, 108 the Court held that this requisite scienter
was equivalent to an intent to defraud (again meeting Justice Jackson's
requisite level). The general rule in the drug offenses of the Comprehen-
sive Drug act is to require an "intentionally" or "knowingly" level of sci-
enter. Similarly, section 2314, Transportation of Stolen Goods, requires
"knowing" violations; 0 9 section 152, Concealment of Assets, requires
the defendant to "knowingly" and "fraudulently" violate the statute;110
section 1951, commonly known as the Hobbs Act, requires violations
that are "in furtherance of" or "wrongful"; 1  section 1952, commonly
known as the Travel Act, prohibits acts "with intent to" violate the stat-
ute;" 2 even the new money laundering statutes of sections 1956 and
1957 require "knowingly" unlawful violations. 1 3 In sum, "[t]he pres-
ence of scienter has been found significant in many cases, and in no cases
where it has been found and discussed has the statute in question been
held unconstitutionally vague."" 14
development and application of mail fraud, see Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 18 DuQ. L. REv.
771 (1980). See also Coffee, From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches
and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. GRIM. L. REv. 177 (1981); Coffee, The Metastis of
Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the 'Evolution'of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. GRIM L. REv. 1 (1983);
Coffee, Hush!: The Criminal Status of Confidential Information After McNally and Carpenter and the Enduring
Problem of Over Criminlization, 26 AM. CsuM. L. REv. 121 (1988).
105 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896).
106 325 U.S. 91 (1945). For an excellent discussion of the necessary mens rea in federal criminal
statutes, see United States v. Nofziger and the Revision of 18 U.S.C. § 207: The Need for a New Approach
To the Mens Rea Requirements of Federal Criminal Law, 65 NOTRE DAME L. Rxv. 803 (1990).
107 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988) ("wilfully"); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C § 1978 ff (1988) ("wilfully"), Public Utility Holding Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 z-3 (1988)
("wilfully"); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77 xxx (1988) ("wilfully"); Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41 (1988) ("wilfully"); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1988) ("wilfully").
108 463 U.S. 646, 663 n.23, 666 n.27 (1983).
109 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1988).
110 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1988).
111 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988) (Hobbs Act). See generally Herman, Organized Crime and White Collar
Crime: Prosecution of Organized Crime Infiltration of Legitimate Business, 16 RUTGERS LJ. 589 (1985); contra,
Note, Limiting Expansion Into Public Corruption Under the Hobbs Act, 18 CONN. L. REV. 183 (1985).
112 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1988) (Travel Act).
113 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (1988) (Money Laundering Act, Banking Secrecy Act). See generally
Plambeck, Confidentiality and Disclosure: The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and Banking Secrecy, 22
INT'L LAw. 69 (1988); Villa, Critical Vew of Banking Secrecy Act Enforcement and the Money Laundering
Statutes, 37 CATHoLic U. L. REV. 489 (1988).
114 Collings, supra note 49, at 227.
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6. Federal Presumption
Another empirical observation of Professor Amsterdam is that state
legislation is more commonly invalidated on vagueness grounds than
federal legislation. 115 This is not intuitive, because absent a first amend-
ment or equal protection shield, state legislative enactments are normally
shown more, not less, deference. This is implicit in the workings of verti-
cal federalism. But virtually all the state statutes invalidated were crimi-
nal statutes, and the corpus of substantive criminal law is state enacted.
Fair-warning rationale is most compelling in the context of the criminal.
Justice Holmes was prompted to say that "although it is not likely that a
criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or
steals, it is reasonable that fair warning should be given to the world in
language that the common world will understand of what the law intends
to do if a certain line is passed." 116
Perhaps a more compelling justification for this federal presumption
of definiteness is the role of the federal judiciary as watchdog. Federal
enactments are presumptively less suspect to grossly violate human free-
doms of speech, marriage and procreation, and locomotion. Moreover,
where the federal statute infringes on these freedoms, the court more
frequently resorts to its powers to construe and administer the statutes
and rarely resorts to invoking the Constitution. As Professor Amsterdam
concluded, "[n]ot only is the Court's ultimate power to interpret and po-
lice federal statutes a ready instrument of mastery, but it must be
remembered that federal statutes will come under adjudication of the
federal judiciary, presumably more sensitive to claims of federal Bill of
Rights freedoms than are state judges." 117 The vagueness buffer zone of
isolation thus operates more severely with respect to state legislation,
while presumptively deferring to federal legislation. RICO pattern
should thus enjoy a presumption of definiteness as a federal statute. This
is so because it implicates no fundamental Bill of Rights freedoms.
7. Vagueness Summation
The void-for-vagueness doctrine has been well developed in its at-
tendant sixty years of use by the Supreme Court. Statutes with in-
dependent scienter requirements are never vague. Federal statutes are
rarely vague. Civil statutes which do not impinge upon the first amend-
ment are almost never vague. For the Supreme Court to violate all these
contours of the void-for-vagueness doctrine would be unprincipled, in-
deed, nothing less than "Cheatin' yourself at solitaire."
115 Note, supra note 45, at 82-83.
116 McDoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
117 Note, supra note 45, at 83 n.80.
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III. Void-for-Vagueness As Applied to RICO "Pattern"
A. Legislative History of Pattern: "You're growin' Rico. This is what you
been after all the time, eh? I saw it in your eyes the first time
I met you . ,118
Such an assertion of vagueness cannot be examined alone, but
rather, must be viewed against the backdrop of RICO's legislative his-
tory-an eleven year process of synthesizing, re-drafting and improving.
When examined in its entirety, the legislative drama that unfolds illus-
trates that "pattern," and its attendant prongs "continuity and relation-
ship," were as much legislative responses to a demanding bar' 9 as they
were preconceived notions. As such, Title X is exceedingly instrumental
in demonstrating and defining RICO pattern.' 20
118 LrrrLE CESAR, supra note-d, at 131.
119 See Goldsmith, RICO and "Pattern:" The Search for "Continuity Plus Relationship", 73 CORNELL L.
REv. 971, 1000 n.182 (1988) [hereinafter Continuity Plus Relationship] ("Moreover, the legislative rec-
ord suggests that Congress intended pattern to have similar applications to both Title IX and Title
X. Congress adopted section 3575(e) in response to criticism by the ABA that Title X, as proposed,
failed to define pattern. Organized Crime Controk Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Comm. on
theJudiciary, on S. 30 and Related Proposals, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 698 (1970) (statement of ABA Presi-
dent Edward L. Wright); 116 CONG. REc. 35,202 (1970). Congress adopted a description of pattern,
proposed by the ABA that was drawn from the Senate Report and designed to provide more "sped-
ficity." ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL Aar OF 1969, S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 165
(1969)."). Professor Goldsmith's work is the most rigorous analysis of RICO pattern to date-he
preceded, but largely anticipated, the holding of H.J. Inc. For an interesting look at Professor Gold-
smith's work, see the three part debate between he and Professor Lynch of Columbia (a staunch
opponent of RICO) in Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being Criminal, (pts. I-IV), 87 COLUM. L. REv. 661,
920 (1987); Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 774 (1988); Lynch, A Reply
to Michael Goldsmith, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 802 (1988). Ironically, Mr. Lynch is now the Chief of the
Criminal Division in the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.
His tune is suprisingly harmonic with the voices of his fellow associates-the former subjects of his
criticism. See L.A. Times,Jan. 7, 1990, at 1, col. 6 ("Lynch said in an interview 'There's nothing that
prevents you from using it [RICO] in fairly trivial, run-of-the mill cases'... He also said it would be
wrong to assume that as a prosecutor he won't make use of every available tool, including RICO. 'It
would be wrong to think anybody, including me ... is going in with the attitude that we're going to
do something different with RICO.' Lynch said.").
120 Although the majority opinion found § 3575(e) instrumental in interpreting the legislative
history of RICO "pattern," Justice Scalia intoned to the contrary:
Unfortunately, if normal (and sensible) rules of statutory construction were followed, the
existence of § 3575(e)-which is the definition contained in another Title of the Act that
was explicitly not rendered applicable to RICO-suggests that whatever "pattern" might
mean in RICO, it assuredly does not mean that.
109 S. Ct. at 29. This conclusion must be viewed as a central tenet to his objection to the majority's
reading of RICO's legislative history. The tenet is flawed on several levels.
First, it was rejected by a majority of the Court. Several briefs noted, like Justice Scalia, its
express inclusion only in Title X. The majority wisely noted that Sedima had previously looked to
this section for guidance; there was ample precedent which pre-dated Justice Scalia's objection.
Second, and most important, § 3575(e) was a direct response by the House to a request by the
American Bar Association to provide "further elaboration" and "increased specificity." 115 CONG.
REc. 5,202 (1970). "The inclusion of a more precise illustration of 'pattern' in Title X but not Title
IX thus does not reflect an intention to give the term 'pattern' different meanings in the two stat-
utes." Continuity Plus Relationship, supra note 119, at 1000 n.182. Moreover, as Professor Goldsmith
has argued, because § 3575(e) is illustrative rather than definitional, the general maximJustice Scalia
refers to is not applicable.
Third, many of the states have been more faithful to the federal legislative history, and explicitly
included the language of § 3575(e) in their respective RICO statutes. Thus, the "general assump-
tion"Justice Scalia refers to was not general nor was it assumed. Overwhelmingly, the states viewed
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1. The Earliest Attempts
In an effort to systematize the attack on the entire underworld family
structure, the 1960 Select Committee on Improper Activities in the La-
bor or Management Field 121 (spearheaded by Senator McClellan), re-
ported a national syndicate of organized crime known as the Mafia or La
Cosa Nostra.122 In 1967 the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and the Administration of Justice (Katzenbach Commission) sug-
gested that new structural approaches should be created at the federal
and state levels to combat "business infiltrated by organized crime."123
One such approach had previously been proposed in 1965 by Congress-
man Biaggio of New York City who proposed prohibiting "knowingly"
becoming or remaining "a member of the Mafia." This bill was rejected
as unconstitutional on its face and violative of Equal Protection because
it applied exclusively to "mafia" criminals. Primarily, it was rightfully
perceived as constituting a "status based offense"-i.e., punishing
Title X as illustrative of the "relationship" and "continuity" prong the Senate and House repeatedly
implored the courts to heed.
Fourth, analytically the same construction would be reached anyway. Section 3575(e) is largely
tautological. RICO consists of "enterprises," "participants," "victims, predicate acts," and .pro-
hibited activities." The 240 different contexts of pattern thus derive from THREE sections ("prohib-
ited activities," "results") TIMES FIVE kinds of ("enterprises") TIMES FOUR kinds of predicate offense
("methods of commission") TIMES FOUR roles in violations ("victims," "participants," "prize," and
"passive instrument."). Blakey & Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious
Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against White-Collar Cime?, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 536 n.37 (1987). In the absence of § 3575(e), if one were thus asked to
demonstrate "relationship" it would be largely expected that "relationship" would be demonstrated
by "acts" that have similar "purposes," "results," "participants," "victims," or "methods of commis-
sion." Equally important, the legislative mandate of the second prong--"continuity"-was explicitly
addressed in the Senate and House hearings as well as § 3575(e). The illustration in § 3575(e) that
pattern includes "acts that .. are not isolated events" certainly addressed the continuity of the
pattern, rather than relationship - the illustration is purely temporal. Thus, this portion of
§ 3575(e) only reiterated the second prong of continuity, but certainly was, and is, applicable to Title
IX-both in the abstract sense, and as a guide for divining Congress' intention.
121 S. REP. No. 72, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. (1965).
122 The accompanying Senate Report to S. 30, see infra n.135, at 34, detailed the known chains of
command for the "Five Families" of New York City. It is more than ironic that these five families
have all been besieged by a slew of RICO indictments and convictions. See, e.g., [1] Bonnano "Fam-
ily": United States v. Bonnano, 852 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 812 (1989); [2]
Gambino "Family": United States v. Gotti, 794 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1986) (bail revocation in RICO
prosecution upheld for head of Gambino Family for threats to witnesses); United States v. Gotti, 641
F. Supp. 283, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Gambino Crime Family"); [3] Genovese "Family": United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (preventive detention of head of Genovese Family in RICO
prosecution constitutional); United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 528-529 (2d Cir. 1989) (prose-
cution of "commission" of La Cosa Nostra for pattern of murder, extortion, labor bribery, loan
sharking); [4] Luchese "Family": United States v. Luchese Organized Crime Family, (E.D.N.Y., No.
CV-89-1848, indictment filed June 6, 1989) (The federal government filed the largest-ever civil
RICO suit against the Luchese and Gambino organized crime families alleging 486 acts of racketeer-
ing by 112 defendants in the private trash carting industry of Long Island); [5] Profuci "Family":
United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming conviction of six defendants for
various offenses arising from Colombo family [heir to Profuci Family] racketeering enterprise but
reversing substantive RICO convictions of two other defendants); United States v. Colombo, 616 F.
Supp. 780 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). The tales of the Five Families were supremely illustrated to the Ameri-
can public in Mario Puzo's classic story, THE GODFATHER (1969). Just desserts are sometimes slow in
coming.
123 PRESIDENTS COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OFJUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME
IN A FREE SocIETr 80-81 (1967).
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criminals for their status as mafia members, and not for their substantive
acts.124
In response to the Katzenbach Commission's plea, two bills were in-
troduced in the Senate, S. 2048125 and S. 2049.126 Both bills 127 were
scrutinized by the A.B.A. which specifically recommended that they be
removed from the corpus of anti-trust law and stand independently, so
that "standing" and "antitrust injury" not be used to thwart their
intent.128
2. Birth of RICO
InJanuary 1969, SenatorJohn L. McClellan of Arkansas introduced
S. 30,129 an integrated, comprehensive crime control measure. On
March 2, 1969, Senator Roman Hruska of Nebraska introduced S.
1623,130 a redraft of S. 2048 and S. 2049. After Hearings on S. 30 and S.
1623, Senators McClellan and Hruska introduced S. 18611s (less than
one month later), which combined the provisions of S. 30 and S. 1623,
and introduced for the first time the term "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity." After review by the Department ofJustice l -2 and others, 3 3 S. 1861
was incorporated, with certain changes, into S. 30 as Title IX.134 One of
the principal changes was that the definition of pattern was narrowed 8 5
by requiring at least two acts, one of which must have been committed
after the effective date of the law. Senator McClellan reported S. 30 out
of the Senate Judiciary Committee on December 18, 1969, and the Sen-
124 There are dozens of federal criminal statutes targeted at organized crime that are not limited
exclusively to organized crime. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 224 (1963) (sports bribery); 18 U.S.C. § 841-8
(1970) (explosives (Title XI OCCA)); 18 U.S.C. § 891-94 (1964) (loansharking); 18 U.S.C. § 1510
(1967) (obstruction of criminal investigation); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1934, 1946) (extortion) (held not
limited to organized crime in United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 373-74 (1978)); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1952 (1961) (Travel Act) (held not limited to organized crime in Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S.
37, 41-45 (1979)); 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (1961) (lottery tickets) (held not limited to organized crime in
United States v. Fabrizio, 385 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1966)); 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970) (business of gam-
bling); 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1934, 1937) (bank robbery) (held not limited to organized crime in Bell
v. United States, 462 U.S. 356, 361-62 (1983); 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1970) (SDO (Title X of OCCA)).
125 S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
126 S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
127 H.R. 11766 and 11268, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. Rc. 17,976 (1967).
128 Organized Crime Controk Hearings on S. 30 Before the Subcomm. No. 5, House Comm. on theJudiciaty,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 538 (1970) [hereinafter House Hearings] (Statement of Edward L. Wright, Presi-
dent of the ABA).
129 S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 769 (1969).
130 The Criminal Activities Profits Act, S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 6,995-96
(1969).
131 The Corrupt Organizations Act of 1969, S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC.
9,568-71 (1969).
132 Clarification of "pattern of racketeering activity" suggested. Measures Relating to Organized
Crime: Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1624, S. 1816, S. 2022, S. 2122, S. 2292
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., Ist
Sess. 405 (1969) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
133 Id. at 268.
134 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 926-928 (Codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976)).
135 Also the requirements of "continuity plus relationship" were established. ORGANIZED CRIME
CONTROL Aar OF 1969, S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) [hereinafter Senate
Report].
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ate passed it overwhelmingly, 73 to 1, on January 23, 1970.136 The
House Judiciary Committee suggested the adoption of treble damages,
and following several attempts to excise the new amendment, 13 7 the
House passed S. 30 by a vote of 431 to 26.138 By a voice vote, the Senate
accepted the House amendments.13 9 President Richard M. Nixon signed
the legislation October 15, 1970.140
3. Specificity of "Pattern"
The drafting of S. 30 was the "culmination of a year of detailed
study, hearings, and consultation."'' 41 Much of the debate focussed on
the more revolutionary aspects of the Organized Crime Control Act.
The pattern provisions of Title IX (RICO) and Title X (Special Danger-
ous Offenders) received comparatively little attention. In May, 1969 the
Department of Justice reviewed S. 30 and Title X. They demanded that
pattern be given adequate legislative "gloss" in the form of more
"specificity":
The definition of professional offender appears to be so vague as pos-
sibly to violate due process. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939). It includes no limits and can easily be read to include any
criminal... In order to withstand a constitutional attack on grounds
of vagueness, therefore, it is felt that the definition of professional of-
fender must be made more pecific and must emphasize a pattern of
specific criminal activity... 2
Similarly, the The Association of the Bar of the City of New York,143 and
the American Bar Association in statements by President-elect Edward L.
Wright 144 criticized Title X for failing to define "pattern." As a solution
to this short-coming, Mr. Wright "took the liberty of consulting some of
the Senate Subcommittee staff on this issue. They drafted suggested lan-
guage . .. which would seem to satisfy the need for increased specific-
ity."' 145 Indeed, this language drafted by the Senate Subcommittee
members was incorporated into Title X of the Organized Crime Control
Act. Section 3575(e) thus read: "criminal conduct forms a pattern if it
embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results,
participants, victims, or methods of commission, or are interrelated by
136 116 CONG. REC. 972 (1970).
137 Also, Congressman Biaggi again tried to amend the bill by outlawing being a "member of the
mafia." 116 CONG. REC. 35,343. Congressman Biaggi was recently disbarred, see In re Disbarment
of Biaggi, 110 S. Ct. 557 (1989) (disbarment order entered), and was convicted of a violation of the
federal Travel Act for his acceptance of bribes (paid vacations) in return for his attempts to induce
favorable rent, and utility rates from New York City. United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89 (2d Cir.
1988).
138 116 CONG. REC. 35,363 (1970).
139 116 CONG. REC. 36,296 (1970).
140 116 CONG. REC. 37,264 (1970).
141 McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) Or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 55, 57 (1970).
142 Senate Report, supra note 135, at 116.
143 House Hearings, supra note 128, at 336 (May 12, 1970) ("nowhere defines what is a sufficient
pattern of conduct" "pattern of conduct.., vague").
144 116 Cong. Rec. 35,202 (1970).
145 House Hearings, supra note 128, at 698 (Letter of Edward L. Wright, Sept. 11, 1970).
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distinguishing characteristics and are not isojated events." 1 46 The ana-
lytic building-blocks of the Brennan majority in H.J. Inc. -- "relationship"
("similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commis-
sion") and "continuity" ("not isolated events")-were thus the result of
a scrutinizing bar and the federal government.
This intensive consideration and shaping of RICO pattern similarly
extended to the potential application of the void-for-vagueness doc-
trine. 147 The Senate Report of S. 30 is invaluable for its discussion of the
void-for-vagueness doctrine and its primary aim, fair warning:
It is this factor -of continuity plus relationship which combines to pro-
duce a pattern. The concept "pattern" is thought to provide no due
process constitutional barriers to criminal sanctions, as a "racketeer-
ing activity" defined above, must be an act in itself subject to criminal
sanction and any proscribed act in the pattern must violate an in-
dependent statute. See United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286
(1969).... Anyone who has engaged in the prohibited activities before
the effective date of the legislation is on prior notice that only one
further act may trigger the increased penalties and new remedies of
this chapter. 148
The Department of Justice* reached the same conclusion in the House
Report on S. 30 when they stated "[w]e believe that the criteria used to
delineate these special offenders [i.e., they must have engaged in a pat-
tern] have been stated so as to withstand serious challenge on grounds of
'vagueness'." 1 49 The specter of vagueness first raised by the Department
ofJustice in 1969 was thus firmly put to rest by late 1970 after the inclu-
sion of the limiting language of "continuity plus relationship" in the ac-
companying Senate Report, and its express incorporation in section
3575(e).
RICO opponents claim that the legislative history of RICO was
aimed exclusively at the "mafia" and organized criminal activity. This
view is incorrect. As HJ. Inc. held, RICO was targeted at, but not limited
to, "organized crime." Similarly, when it comes to RICO pattern these
legislative historians have a selective memory. RICO pattern as an oper-
ative term, as well as its attendant prongs "continuity plus relationship"
were legislative responses to a demanding bar. Indeed, the Senate Re-
port, properly considered and rejected the claim that pattern would vio-
late due process precisely because any act within the pattern must
"violate an independent statute." This is indeed, is what RICO's framers
were ". . . after all the time..."
146 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1970) (section 3575(e) was repealed and replaced by a similar provision,
28 U.S.C. § 994(i)(2) (1988)).
147 Indeed, one student authored Note discussed the void-for-vagueness doctrine as applied to
RICO pattern. Note, supra note 38, at 489-92. The Note merely recounted the legislative history
relevant to previous cases and challenges. The Note failed to discuss the repeated debates in the
House and Senate which identified, and later solved, the alleged void-for-vagueness infirmitites in
the pattern concept. In this sense, the legislative history reported in this Note can be misleading.
148 Senate Report, supra note 135, at 158.
149 H. R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., Ist Sen. 4067 (1970).
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B. Fort Wayne Books: "You got so you can dish it out,
but you can't take it no more. ",150
Not only did the legislature raise, contemplate, and ultimately reject
void-for-vagueness infirmities in RICO pattern, but the Supreme Court
too has rejected a similar challenge in the RICO context. In Fort Wayne
Books, Inc. v. Indiana,151 and its sister case Sappenfield v. Indiana, Justice
White and his colleagues Chief'Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy,
Scalia and Blackmun addressed whether the Indiana RICO statute was
unconstitutionally vague as applied to obscenity predicate offenses. The
logic and conceptual framework employed is particularly useful because
the decision is so recent. Prosecutors in Howard County, Indiana
charged Sappenfield with six counts of distribution of obscene matter, a
state misdemeanor. 152 In addition, prosecutors used these alleged predi-
cate acts of obscenity as "patterns of racketeering activity" in two RICO
charges. The trial court dismissed the two RICO counts on the grounds
that the Indiana RICO statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to
obscenity predicate offenses. 153 The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed.
The Indiana Supreme Court declined to review the lower court's hold-
ing.154 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of
the important first amendment challenge to the facial validity of the Indi-
ana RICO statute. 155
Sappenfield contended that the United States Constitution forbids
the use of obscenity violations as predicate acts for a RICO violation be-
cause the predicate act-distribution of obscene materials-is inherently
vague. White's opinion rejected this contention by constructing a very
strong syllogism. First, the RICO statute at issue wholly incorporates the
state obscenity law as a predicate act within "pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity." Second, Indiana obscenity standards are not "inherently vague"
but closely conform to the Court's Miller 156 standards. Ergo, the RICO
law itself cannot be vague as determined by the trial court, because there
is no defect in the underlying obscenity law. Indeed, the Court's lan-
guage was particularly forceful:
We find no merit in Petitioner's claim that the Indiana RICO law is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to obscenity predicate offenses.
Given that the RICO statute totally encompasses the obscenity law, if
the latter is not unconstitutionally vague, the former cannot be vague
either.157
Moreover, the Court postulated that pattern is necessarily less vague
than the underlying predicate acts when it noted:
150 LrrrLE CAESAR, supra note 1, at 132.
151 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
152 IND. CODE § 35-49-3-1 (Supp. 1987).
153 109 S. Ct. at 922.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Miller v. California, 418 U.S. 915 (1974).
157 109 S. Ct. at 924-25.
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Indeed, because the scope of the Indiana RICO law is more limited
than the scope of the State's obscenity statute-with obscenity-related
RICO prosecutions possible only where one is guilty of a "pattern" of
obscenity violations-it would seem that the RICO statute is inher-
ently less vague than any state obscenity law: a prosecution under the
RICO law will be possible only where all the elements of an obscenity
offense are present, and then some. 158
Importantly, Fort Wayne Books was argued as a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of using obscenity predicate acts to form a "pattern of
racketeering activity." Fort Wayne Books was not a more narrow attack on
the nature of obscenity alone. As such, the Court seems necessarily con-
strained by the analysis and construct of Fort Wayne Books. Pattern is no
more than the sum of its "parts"-in each case the "parts" must fall
before the "whole" can be deemed unconstitutional as applied. This an-
alytical construct is particularly powerful. Moreover, it is buttressed by
RICO's legislative history. 15 9
Ostensibly, Justice O'Connor shares the views on pattern that the
majority expressed in Fort Wayne Books. Although Justice O'Connor dis-
sented from the grant of jurisdiction to hear Sappenfield before a final
judgment, the analytic approach she took in Fort Wayne seems to support
the majority position in both cases. She wrote, "I concur in the Court's
disposition of Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana .... which presents, among
others, the same question as presented in Sappenfield . . . There is no
constitutional bar to the State's inclusion of substantive obscenity viola-
tions among the predicate offenses under its RICO statute."' 60
Conversely, Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Marshall and Bren-
nan joined in dissent, argued that the Indiana RICO law was unconstitu-
tionally vague as applied to obscenity predicate offenses. Justice Stevens
added that obscenity predicates, absent some connection to minors or
obtrusive display, are, in and of themselves, unconstitutionally vague.
The resultant pattern of two such offenses "only compounds the intracta-
ble vagueness of the obscenity concept itself."' 6 ' Read literally, the dis-
sent indicates only that Justice Stevens views obscenity statutes as
unconstitutionally vague, and provides no indication that pattern involv-
ing any other predicate offense, nor circumstance, would be void-for-
vagueness.162
158 Id. at 925 n.7.
159 See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
160 109 S. Ct. at 930-31.
161 109 S. Ct. at 934.
162 However, in an offhand manner, Justice Stevens noted:
Ironically, the legal test for determining the existence of a pattern of racketeering activity
has been likened to "Justice Stewart's famous test for obscenity-'I know it when I see it'-
set forth in his concurrence inJacobe!is v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)." Morgan v. Bank of
Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 977 (7th Cir. 1986) [sic] (citing Papai v. Cremosnick, 635 F. Supp.
1402, 1410 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
Id. at 934 n.14 This witty anecdote only serves to muddle Justice Steven's analysis; moreover, it is
inappropriate. The original quote by Judge Moran in the Northern District of Illinois said, "because
the scheme and the episode concept can easily slip into an 'I know it when I see it style' of discourse,
we are reluctant to follow either concept." Papai v. Cremosnick, 635 F. Supp. at 1410. It was this
mutiple scheme or episode analysis that Judge Moran criticized, not the concept of pattern as a
whole.
1990] NOTE
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
In sum, the Court properly demonstrated that both prongs of the
void-for-vagueness doctrine have been satisfied. First, like Sappenfield
suggested, fair warning cannot reasonably be implicated when the predi-
cate offenses have always been state crimes-only the penalty applied is
in dispute,1 63 not the offender's culpability. Second, courts and prosecu-
tors have circuit precedent within which the prospect of arbitrary or ca-
pricious enforcement is largely circumscribed.164
The legislative history of RICO wisely considered that RICO pattern
comprised of independent state predicate acts would pose "no due pro-
cess constitutional" barrier. Six members of the Supreme Court in Fort
Wayne Books added that if the predicate act is not vague, the pattern can-
not be vague either. Moreover, a pattern of such acts is "inherently less
vague." The structure for any vagueness challenge to RICO pattern is
firmly imbedded in Fort Wayne Books. The Court has "dished out" its
medicine in the context of RICO "pattern," it must now learn to live with
the analysis.
C. Circuit Court Unanimity: "What do you say, boys? Three cheers for
Rico!. .. Rico! Rico! Rico!" 165
This conceptual framework is not a unique Supreme Court doctrine.
In a series of decisions dating from the 1970s, the lower federal courts
have similarly analyzed RICO pattern, and rejected all assertions that
pattern is void-for-vagueness. 166 The most basic challenge in these cases
presented to RICO pattern has been a facial challenge. Pattern could be
found facially unconstitutional only if protected speech, or a similar fun-
163 A related constitutional challenge has been the forfeiture provisions of RICO, and particularly
their application to attorney fees. See Blakey, Forfeiture of Legal Fees: Who Stands to Lose?, 36 EMORY LJ.
781 (1987). Traditionally limited to drug cases in South Florida, the prospect that attorney fees in
routine criminal RICO prosecutions might be subject to forfeiture is alarming. See Nat. L.J., Nov. 6,
1989, at 2, col. 2. ("NewJersey's U.S. Attorney's office has told lawyers for Eddie Antar, founder of
bankrupt Crazy Eddie Inc., that their fees will be subject to forfeiture if he is convicted of racketeer-
ing. It would be the first time attorney's fees are seized in a white-collar case, observers say.") The
reform movement can not be considered independent of prosecutorial discretion; to the extent pros-
ecutors ask for forfeiture of attorney fees in complex securities fraud cases, the prospect for congres-
sional reform would be greatly magnified.
164 Indeed, the reform movement in Congress is largely a jurisdictional movement. Rep.
Boucher's bill attacks the very culpability of certain predicate acts-commodities fraud, accounting
fraud, corporate fraud, securities fraud--not the manner nor degree of arbitrariness in the enforce-
ment. As such, the vagueness charges become merely illusory, a cloak covering the true motivation
of anti-RICO forces. See infra notes 300-08 and accompanying text.
165 LrrrLE CAEsAR, supra note 1, at 116.
166 But see Mollard, Firestone Lawsuit Cost $7 Million in Legal Fees, Bus. First-Columbus, July 16,
1990, at 2, col. 1. United States DistrictJudgeJames L. Graham dismissed a $1.3 billion lawsuit filed
by the Firestone's alleging that the Galbreath family had transferred assets out a family trust. "It
[the decision] declared the RICO statute unconstitutional as written and applied to the Galbreath
and Bricker defendants because the concept of showing a 'pattern of racketeering activity' is uncon-
stitutionally vague, the judge said." Id. Such an unwarranted finding will almost certainly be over-
turned by the Sixth Circuit on appeal. Judge Graham's ruling RICO pattern unconstitutional "as
written and applied" reveals his fundamental misunderstanding of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
Only a facial challenge to RICO pattern couldjustify finding pattern unconstitutional "as written."
But since the Firestone-Galbreath dispute was conspicuously devoid of first amendment issues, a
facial challenge could not be sustained. Furthermore, RICO pattern "as applied" could only be
found unconstitutional if (1) the predicate acts-mail and wire fraud-were found unconstitutionally
vague or (2) the "continuity plus relationship" test itself was found unconstitutionally vague. Judge
Graham's decision supported neither finding, and is therefore deficient.
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damental right, were implicated by RICO. Since most detractors of the
statute have focussed on the civil applications of RICO-principally mail
and wire fraud-a facial challenge to the statute's definiteness is mis-
guided. Rather, pattern may be challenged on vagueness grounds only
"as applied" to the facts of the particular case. As Fort Wayne Books makes
clear, constitutional challenges to RICO pattern "as applied" must allege
that the predicate acts themselves are void-for-vagueness. Another pos-
sible challenge "as applied" to a particular case, is that the "continuity
plus relationship" test of H.J. Inc. is unconstitutionally vague. Although
Justice Scalia deridingly termed the test about as "helpful to the conduct
of their affairs as 'life is a fountain,' " the test is logically consistent and
perfunctory in application.1 67 Thus, pattern may be challenged as vague
because either the predicate acts, or the "continuity plus relationship"
test either: (1) fails to give prospective notice and fair warning to defend-
ants, or (2) places arbitrary or discriminatory discretion in the hands of
prosecutors, judges or the jury.
1. Hj. Inc.'s "Continuity Plus Relationship" Test Vague?
FollowingJustice Scalia's invitation, many challengers will assert that
the pattern test set forth in H.J. Inc. is vague. But, if we graphically trace
the logic of the Court's "continuity plus relationship" test, we conclude
that six questions must be asked and answered in order to establish
whether a "pattern" is present: (1) is the series of acts (at least two)
related to one another, for example, are they part of a single scheme? (2)
if not, are they related to an external organizing principle, for example,
to the affairs of the enterprise? If the answer to both questions is "no,"
there is no relationship between the acts and there cannot be a pattern.
If the answer to either question is "yes," there is a relationship between
the acts, and we must ask three further questions to search for continuity:
(3) is the series of acts open-ended, that is, do the acts have no termina-
tion point? (4) if not, did the close-ended series of acts go on for a sub-
stantial period of time, that is, more than a few weeks or months? If the
answer to either question is "yes," continuity is present, there is a "pat-
tern" of racketeering activity. If the answer to both questions is "no," up
to two additional questions must be asked: (5) may a threat of continuity
be inferred from the character of the illegal enterprise? (6) if not, may a
threat of continuity be inferred because the acts represent the regular
way of doing business of a lawful enterprise? If the answer to either
question is "yes," a threat of continuity is present, both the relationship
and continuity prongs of the test have been met, and a "pattern of racke-
teering activity" has been alleged. 168
The initial circuit court to squarely face the constitutionality of
RICO pattern following H.J., Inc. was the First Circuit in United States v.
167 FormerJudge Getzendanner of the Northern District of Illinois, who has written many RICO
opinions, stated, "After analyzing pattern in a number of cases, I found identifying patterns a rela-
tively easy, low-risk task." GetzendannerJudicial "Pruning" of "Garden Variety Fraud" Civil RICO Cases
Does Not Work It's Time for Congress to Act, 43 VAD. L. REv. 673, 677 (1990).
168 See Myths, supra note 38, at 961-62 n.343.
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Angiu/0.169 Angiulo, leader of the Boston arm of La Cosa Nostra (known
as the "Patriarca Family"), contended that the exact scope of the "con-
tinuity plus relationship" test proffered in H.J. Inc. could not be fixed
with sufficient clarity. The court answered, however, that even if the
"continuity plus relationship" test was vague in some marginal circum-
stances, this did not exonerate Angiulo's actions. 70 Facial challenges to
statutes, which assert vagueness in marginal cases, may only be brought
to protect first amendment activity. Angiulo had properly to bring a
challenge to RICO pattern "as applied" to his activity. The court
concluded:
Thus, although RICO's "pattern" element may be vague in some con-
texts, a matter on which we express no opinion, it is not vague in the
context before us. A person of ordinary intelligence could not help
but realize that illegal activities of an organized crime family [gam-
bling, loansharking, and conspiracy] fall within the ambit of RICO's
pattern of racketeering activity. 171
The constitutionality of RICO pattern outside of the organized crime
context was thus properly reserved for later judgment.
The Third Circuit similarly found RICO pattern not unconstitution-
ally vague in United States v. Pungitore.172 Sixty members of the Philadel-
phia branch of La Cosa Nostra (known as the "Scarfo Family") were
convicted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of a pattern of racke-
teering activity that included murder, attempted murder, illegal gam-
bling, and extortion. Relying on Justice Scalia's concurrence in H.J. Inc.,
the appellants contended that RICO pattern was unconstitutionally
vague because it "failed to place them on notice as to what conduct falls
within its parameters." The court properly noted, however, that facial
challenges are permitted only when defendant's are protecting first
amendment activity. The court ruled that "persons of ordinary intelli-
gence would know that the repeated commission of murder, extortion,
illegal gambling, and usury offenses" could constitute a RICO pattern,
and that the challenge was "utterly devoid of merit."' 173 Citing affirma-
tively to Angiulo, the court concluded:
We think that it is clear that the potential due process problems noted
by Justice Scalia in H.J. Inc. are not present in organized crime cases.
Unlike H.J. Inc. which involved allegations of corruption within the
ranks of a legitimate business, the application of RICO to the activities
of the Scarfo crime family could not have come as a surprise to the
members of the family. In fact, we have doubts that a successful
169 897 F.2d 1169 (Ist Cir. 1990).
170 Id. at 1179.
171 Id. at 1180.
172 United States v. Pungitore, No. 89-1371 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Currnt file).
173 The court noted in a footnote that the governments contention that the analysis of Fort Wayne
Books controlled was erroneous. Fort Wayne Books urged that unless the predicate acts themselves
were unconstitutionally vague, a pattern of such acts could not be. Rather, the analysis of H.J. Inc.
controlled because appellants contended that the "continuity plus relationship" test of H.. Inc. was
unconstitutionally vague.
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vagueness challenge to RICO ever could be raised by defendants in an
organized crime case.
Pungitore is troubling for two reasons, however. First, although the
court said the "continuity plus relationship" test itself, and not the predi-
cate acts, must pass constitutional muster, the court applied the notice
test-"persons of ordinary intelligence"-to the predicate acts of murder
extortion, illegal gambling and usury. Perhaps the court found that the
analysis of Fort Wayne Books is very broad indeed. Second, the court im-
plied in dicta that an organized crime limitation may still have some vital-
ity.174 This is troubling because the "continuity plus relationship" test
174 The Third Circuit is not alone in its attempt to read an organized crime limitation into RICO
through the void-for-vagueness doctrine. The following discourse in oral argument between justice
Scalia and Mark Reinhart, counsel for H.J. Inc., revealed Justice Scalia's true motivation to challenge
RICO pattern-inserting an organized crime limitation into the text. Mr. Reinhart properly
thwarted Justice Scalia's attempt to"end-run" the facts of the case by pointedly noting that an "or-
ganized crime" limitation was not argued in the Eighth Circuit, but was wholly a creation ofJustice
Scalia:
QUESTION: Couldn't one say that what you need in addition is activity that can rea-
sonably be characterized as racketeering activity; that is to say, the kind of activity that
would normally be conducted by organized crime?
MR. REINHART: Well, Your Honor, in a way that is what Congress said. They de-
fined racketeering activity in (1), and they did not add, though, when committed by organ-
ized crime. They said these acts. It is defined here. There's no further definitional
requirement needed.
The person likewise is defined, and throughout this statute you will see no limitation to
organized crime. This-and in fact, the person-this argument, trying to limit the person
defendant has been rejected, and now the amid are trying to work it in through the word
"pattern," through the action word in the statute, not though the subject word.
But Footnote 14 in Sedima has already recognized that Congress, and indeed this
Court, finds two elements in pattern: relationship, relatedness and continuity. There was
no discussion of and being a member of organized crime or earning your money through
organized crime.
IndeedJustice Scalia, the Congress did know well the principle of including substantial
income from crime or expert criminality because they did it in Title X, the nest title of this
act, where they said if you have a pattern and you have substantial income and you are an
expert criminal, then you get enhanced punishment. Clearly those were not included
within pattern, at least as they saw pattern.
Congress well knew that the purview of RICO was beyond organized crime. The
Sedima decision is replete with examples from the congressional debate, and it's well laid
out there. The New York City Bar strenuously objected to the statute. The two sponsors,
Congressman Poff and Senator McClellan, both explicitly stated that it extends beyond or-
ganized crime.
The predicate acts, as pointed out in Sedima, give the breadth to the statute because
they include acts that are not normally committed by organized crime. The organized
crime connection requirement has been virtually uniformly rejected by lower courts. Re-
spondent did not argue this to the Eighth Circuit-one of the first circuits in the country to
reject the organized crime connection in the case of Bennett v. Berg.
I submit that Respondent and amid miss the point when they argue that legitimate
businesses are being pulled within the purview of RICO. Only those who commit not one
but a pattern of racketeering activity are within RICO. Such businesses forfeit the right to
call themselves legitimate.
The Eighth Circuit's attempt to restrict the statute should be reversed, this case should
be remanded, and amid's attempt to rewrite RICO to include an organized crime connec-
tion requirement should be rejected.
As this Court said in Sedima, legitimate business enjoys no immunity from the conse-
quences of criminal activity.
OFFiCrAL TRANscRiPT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEs, HJ. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., Case No. 87-1252, at 16-18 (Nov. 8, 1988) (Alderson Reporting
Co.).
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should be no more clear in the organized crime context than in the legiti-
mate business context. H.J. Inc. expressly provided for the application of
the "continuity plus relationship" test to legitimate business, not only
through its explicit rejection of an organized crime limitation, but also by
noting that "a regular way of conducting defendant's ongoing legitimate
business" establishes a continous pattern. In the future, courts would be
wise to ask the six questions H.J. Inc. analytically set forth and reject bald
assertions of vagueness that really focus on the constitutionality of the
predicate acts-at least in this sense the Pungitore court was successful.
2. Pre-H.J. Inc. Courts Focus On Notice
a. Notice From a Pattern Of Racketeering Activity?
One of the first federal district courts to address the applicability of
the void-for-vagueness doctrine to RICO pattern was United States v. Stof-
sky.1 75 Counsel in Sto/ksy used an innovative challenge. They suggested
that while "pattern of racketeering activity" may be adequately defined in
isolation, the phrase "conduct or participate. . . in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.. ." as ap-
plied in section 1962(c) was vague.' 76 Without such a definition "the
prospective defendant cannot predict with any certainty conduct sought
to be made unlawful."' 77 The court answered the allegation with some
of the most precise language used by any court to date:
[T]he statute is clear enough. The elements of the predicate offenses
are well-defined and established. It would be futile for a person to
argue that he had no warning or knowledge that his commission of
such acts would violate the law. Thus the only serious question is
whether Section 1962(c) gives him adequate warning that the commis-
sion of more than one such criminal act under certain circumstances
constitutes an additional, separate crime for which there is a separate
penalty. With respect to this aspect, the statutory scheme of Section
1962(c) is not unlike that of 21 U.S.C. Section 848 which proscribes "a
continuing criminal enterprise" in drug trafficking. That statute also
creates a separate offense based on the commission of predicate
crimes under certain defined circumstances. Neither statute contains a
requirement of scienter independent or in addition to that necessary
to prove the predicate crimes. It was characterized as a business regu-
latory statute and upheld against a vagueness attack in United States v.
Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1973), with the Court of Appeals rely-
ing in part on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162
(1972), where the Court said, "[I]n the field of regulatory statutes gov-
erning business activities, where the acts limited are in a narrow cate-
gory, greater leeway is allowed." If this language is applicable to 21
U.S.C. 848, where the purpose of Congress is to eradicate totally illicit
enterprises, it would seem all the more applicable to 18 U.S.C. Section
1962 where the congressional purpose is to eradicate criminal means
of acquiring, maintaining and conducting any enterprise affecting
commerce. Given the leeway of a regulatory statute (and even without
175 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
176 Id. at 612.
177 Id.
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such leeway), Section 1962(c) sufficiently places men of reasonable in-
telligence on notice... 178
Counsel further argued that only acts that further the illegitimate
business objectives should be illegal under RICO. The court rejected
this legitimate/illegitimate distinction by stating, "IT]his may be broad,
but it is not vague."' 79 Finally, counsel argued that accidental or unre-
lated behavior is not subject to section 1962(c). The court agreed and
introduced 18 U.S.C. section 3575 as an analogy. "Statutes enacted to-
gether within the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 have been con-
strued in pari materia... [I]t would seem that it [section 3575] may be
used to cast light on the word pattern as used in section 196 1.$180 Stofsky
thus stands for several propositions: (1) to the extent the predicate of-
fenses are well-defined, defendants have been fairly apprised of the ille-
gality of their acts, (2) legitimate businesses are subject to penalties of
RICO, (3) section 3575 may be used in pari materia to construe pattern
within RICO.
Following closely on the heels of the Stofsky decision was the Second
Circuit's' 8 1 decision in United States v. Parness. 182 Parness was alleged to
have aquired an interest in a St. Maarten hotel-casino through a pattern
of racketeering involving the conversion and interstate transportation of
gambling marker proceeds.'8 3 Parness asserted in his defense that the
statute failed to provide a sufficient warning that his behavior was pro-
scribed because he was uncertain whether he would be indicted for the
predicate offenses.' 8 4 "Pattern of racketeering activity" was thus, in Par-
ness' view, unconstitutionally vague as applied to his behavior. The court
responded that predicate offenses must only be "indictable" not actually
"indicted."'18 5 Moreover, the Court explained:
The Constitutional validity of a statute does not depend on whether
there are marginal cases in which its clarity may be in doubt. Rather
the test is whether the statute conveys an adequate warning as applied
in a specific situation. Here, the interstate transportation of the two
cashiers checks clearly were indictable acts under § 2314. They pro-
178 Id at 612-13.
179 Id at 613.
180 Id at 614.
181 One of the first circuit court of appeals to address the constitutionality of Federal RICO was
the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Cappetto. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974). Dismissing sugges-
tions that the civil redress provisions of section 1964 were vague, the court noted:
The argument that Section 1964 is unconstitutionally vague is also without merit. That
section, like Section 4 of the Sherman Act, is merely a specific grant ofjurisdiction to en-
force the substantive provisions of the statute by injunction. The kinds of activity to which
the injunction may be addressed are described with sufficient particularity in these substan-
tive provisions, Section 1955 and Section 1962.
Id at 1357-58. Although the term pattern was not specifically challenged, the Seventh Circuit held
that to find a central provision of RICO void-for-vagueness-in this case section 1964 injunctive
relief-the underlying substantive provisions must first be found unconstitutionally vague. Id at
1358.
182 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974).
183 Id at 431.
184 Id at 440.
185 Id at 441.
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vide unambiguous predicates for the § 1962(b) "pattern." We reject
Parness' claim that § 1962(b) is unconstitutionally vague .... 186
Parness embraced two analytical concepts that are critical to the under-
standing of vagueness. First, marginal cases are irrelevant to a defend-
ant's assault on vagueness grounds (absent first amendment claims).
Second, fair warning is satisfied by the proscription of predicate offenses,
not by the actual indictment of the offense.
Another district court faced a direct challenge to the constitutional-
ity of RICO pattern in United States v. White. 187 Specifically, White chal-
lenged, "the definition of the element of 'pattern of racketeering' is
vague and uncertain and fails to give a defendant definite and proper
notice as to what activity is proscribed."'' 8 8 The court dismissed the de-
fendant's assertion noting instead what pattern is: "In common usage,
the term 'pattern' is applied to a combination of qualities or acts forming
a consistent or characteristic arrangement."' 89 After further noting that
the defendant's acts were of a "continuing criminal activity" sufficient to
meet this requirement, the court said "I am persuaded by the reasoning
of the district court in United States v. Stofsky."90 Once again, to the ex-
tent that the predicate acts were well-defined,; there was sufficient fair
warning to satisfy the requirements of due process.
In United States v. Swiderski, 191 a similar assault was mounted on the
constitutionality of RICO pattern. The challenge simply stated that any
provisions of RICO employing the language "pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity" were "too vague to put persons on notice that their activities are
illegal."' 192 The court answered this charge by looking to the rationale of
United States v. Campanale, and United States v. Stofsky for constitutional
validations of the language. 198 They stressed, first, that no party was
subject to the conspiracy unless he committed two predicate acts of rack-
eteering activity. Second, RICO presented no more of a "notice" prob-
lem than more conventional conspiracy statutes-both rendered
defendants liable for inchoate offenses. So too, in United States v. The-
vis,194 a frontal assault on the constitutionality of most of the provisions
of section 1962(c) was rejected by the court. In particular they found the
phrase "through a pattern of racketeering activity". "is not unconstitu-
tional under the vagueness doctrine." In addition, defendants framed a
vagueness as applied argument. The court responded that this claim
"has even less merit," because the racketeering activity all furthered the
purpose of their pornography business.195 Thus, "there can be no real
argument that this conduct was in an area of such attenuated and ambig-
uous criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c) that the conduct
186 Id. (citations omitted).
187 368 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
188 Id. at 883.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 884 (citation omitted).
191 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
192 Id. at 1246.
193 Id.
194 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D.Ga. 1979).
195 Id. at 140.
[Vol. 65:1106
of the defendants should be protected by the shield of the vagueness
doctrine."' 96
b. Notice to Legitimate/Illegitimate Businesses?
Another argument that challengers have made is that RICO is vague
because the defendant had no notice that legitimate businesses (or ille-
gitimate businesses in the case of the mafia) were subject to the sanctions
of RICO. United States v. Scalzitti 197 involved a vagueness challenge that
contended that "insofar as no distinction is made between the illegal but
incidental or peripheral functions of an otherwise legitimate concern and
an enterprise whose sole raison d'etre is to serve as a front for racketeer-
ing, the statute must fail as being too indefinite."' 98 The court answered
the challenge by citing Stofsky verbatim. The challenge was noteworthy
in that it followed closely on the heels of Stofsky and illustrated willing-
ness of the other federal district courts to adopt the compelling reason-
ing of the Stofsky court.'9 9 In United States v. Field,200 a district court
similarly held section 1962(c) not unconstitutionally'vague. Like Stofsky,
the defendant alleged that RICO requires proof that the enterprise itself
was corrupt, and that the defendant's activities advanced the purposes of
the enterprise. The court, of course, rejected this allegation, "Section
1962(c) nowhere requires proof regarding the advancement of the
union's affairs ... or proof that the union itself is corrupt, or proof that
the union authorized the defendant to do [the] acts." 20' Citing at length
from Stofsky, the court similarly stressed that the state acts alleged are
well-defined, and that criminal responsibility is attendant with a pattern
of such violations, whether the enterprise was legitimate or illegitimate.
Surprisingly, the notion that illegitimate businesses could claim they
had no notice that mafia families could be RICO enteprises was litigated
repeatedly throughout the country. In a 1974 case, United States v. Castel-
lano,202 nine New York "mafia" loan sharks203 were convicted on section
196 Id
197 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D.Pa. 1975).
198 I d at 1015.
199 Another constitutional challenge to § 1962(c) was summarily dismissed in United States v.
Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), by merely referring to Stofsky.
200 432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
201 Id at 58.
202 416 F. Supp. 125 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
203 The principal defendant in the case, Big Paul Castellano, was the leader of the Gambino
"Family" at the time of his indictment. His ironic and newsworthy assassination was described by
Shana Alexander in the book THE PIZZA CONNEMrION at 88-89 (1988) ("[5:15 P.M. Midtown, New
York] [Castellano] and Billoti [were] anxious to get to their next appointment, a dinner reservation
at Sparks steakhouse, across town on East 46th between Second and Third Avenues ... Billoti edged
into East 46th street and pulled up beside the red canopy with the legend SPARKS stenciled on its
side. As Paul Castellano stepped out of the Lincoln, he failed to notice the yellow taxicab pull across
the junction of the street and block off the flow of traffic. Thomas Billoti had just ciosed the door of
the car when he caught a glimpse of two men in tan Burberry raincoats and caps advancing toward
Castellano. Both raised their hands at the same instant, and Billoti was hit in the head with a bullet
from a 9 mm Browning automatic pistol. Castellano stood staring at the hit men, frozen, as they shot
him twice in the head and once in the chest. He collapsed at the side of the Lincoln as the two
gunmen ran to a waiting car at the corner of 46th and second... (ellipses in original) ... At New
York University Law School, the room set aside for Professor Blakey's cocktail reception [preceding
a RICO seminar] was comfortably crowded. The gathering was predominantly male, white, mid-
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1962(c) and (d) counts. They argued that RICO Section 1962(c) was un-
constitutionally vague as applied to them, because it failed to give ade-
quate and fair warning that illegitimate business as well as legitimate
were within RICO's ambit. 2°4 They quoted extensively from RICO's leg-
islative history which focused on the "mafia's" infiltration of "legitimate"
business. 20 5 The court noted the legitimate/illegitimate distinction was
rejected by the Second Circuit in United States v. Darney. Furthermore,
the court noted that the question of fair warning was not warning in the
abstract, but whether there was sufficient clarity of warning in this partic-
ular case. The court concluded "[i]t is clear to us that the statute's lan-
guage is not vague in including not only legitimate business but also
illegitimate business." 206 In United States v. Clemente,207 Professor Alan
M. Dershowitz of Harvard Law School argued for the defendant, Cle-
mente, that the RICO conspiracy count against him was unconstitution-
ally vague. Since Clemente was the New York waterfront mafia
ringleader, Professor Dershowitz was put in the unusual position of hav-
ing to argue that RICO only applied to legitimate businesses. The court
responded that, "[w]e decline in this case to construe the RICO statute
so as to allow the appellants a defense that they made sure not to engage
in any legal activity." 208
c. Notice To Persons of Their Own Enterprise?
A slight variation of this argument asserted that defendants had no
notice that liability could attach to racketeering acts of their own en-
teprise. In United States v. Martino, a major arson ring in South Florida
involving twenty-three defendants, 20 9 200 witnesses, sixty-nine alleged
thirties to early forties. Conservative suits, quiet sports jackets, and neatly groomed hair were the
dress mode. Ron Goldstock [Chief of New York state Organized Crime Strike Force] sipped a glass
of white wine. Then the electronic beeper attached to his waistband started to sound. Next, at
random, like popcorn in a skillet, beepers began going off throughout the crowded room, and FBI
agents and New York police officials scrambled to get to the phones. News of the Castellano hit had
spread like wildfire. Platoons of law-enforcement personnel quietly but rapidly excused themselves
and left. Professor Blakey's lecture on dealing with organized crime had been upstaged by organ-
ized crime dealing with its own. .
204 416 F. Supp. at 128.
205 Id at 127.
206 Id. at 128.
207 640 F.2d 1069 (2nd Cir. 1981). Some of the more interesting tape recordings introduced as
evidence at the trial included co-defendent Thomas Buzzanca's [President of two New York Interna-
tional Longshoreman's Associations] following statement: "Tino's [Fiumara] good point is that eve-
rybody fears and respects him. That's a good thing... I absolutely think, if this guy tempers himself,
he'll be, ten years from now, he'll be aweseome ... He'll have the best of two worlds. Good sense,
good judgment. Plus, which we all live under fear. Ya need to have that balance ... We'll make
money. We'll steal it if we have to." Id. at 1075. Mr. Fiumara, the New Jersey waterfront "boss"
received a 25-year sentence for his good judgment. He currently resides in Leavenworth Kansas
federal prison and it seems certain he will serve the entirety of his term. See Fiumara v. O'Brien, 889
F.2d 254 (10th Cir. 1989) (no abuse of discretion in finding Tino Fiumara responsible, although
unconvicted, of four murders for purposes of parole denial).
208 Id. at 545-46 (citing United States v. Provensano, 620 F.2d 985, 993 (3d Cir. 1980)).
209 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. June 1981), reh'g granted, en banc, 681 F.2d 952 (1982). RICO was
endearingly termed "Congress's solar plexus blow to organized crime," 681 F.2d at 963. Con-
versely, critics have lamented RICO as a "monster," Hentoff, The Monster RICO Has Become, L.A.
DailyJ.,June 27, 1989, at 6, col. 3; "legal atom bomb," Green, This Law's Like a LegalAtom Bomb, L.A.
DailyJ., April 3, 1989, at 6, col. 6; "bludgeon," RICO: Assault With a Deadly Weapon, N.Y. Times,Jan.
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overt acts and fifty-six alleged predicate acts, presented such a challenge.
The court summarily dismissed the vagueness challenge as follows:
Appellants third contention, that RICO is unconstitutionally vague,
was rejected in United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir.
1976); in which we held that a person of average intelligence, upon
reading the statute with the aid of relevant definitional provisions,
"could not help but realize that they would be criminally liable for
participating in 'any enterprise,' including their own," through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity." 2 10
In the leading Fifth Circuit case on pattern definiteness, United States
v. Hawes,211 eight defendants who were charged with distributing coin-
operated electronic gambling machines212 argued that they had no notice
or fair warning because a person could not expect to be included in his
own "enterprise," thus RICO was vague as applied. The court did not
entertain the person/enterprise distinction for long:
We cannot agree with this line of reasoning. In its classic formulation
of the standard for establishing unconstitutional vagueness, the
Supreme Court held that a penal statute "must be sufficiently explicit
to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties." If "men of common intelligence"
must guess at the meaning of a statute, the statute violates due process
of law. By this standard, quoting from § 1962(c), we hold that "any
person" of average intelligence, on a clear reading of that statute, to-
gether with relevant definitional provisions, could not help but realize
that they would be criminally liable. . .213
The Fifth Circuit thus firmly stated that the vagueness standards were
easily met; RICO pattern provided sufficient notice and fair warning to
apprise the defendant that his actions were unlawful.
d. Notice From Wire Fraud Predicate Acts?
A Sixth Circuit case, United States v. Morelli, 214 decided that wire
fraud predicate acts provide sufficient notice to potential defendants to
maintain RICO's constitutional definiteness. Morelli contended that
RICO was unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct: Morelli
allegedly allowed his name to be used (in the context of his being the
Detroit Giacolone Family's "main man") in order to coerce and extort
illegal loan sharking payments. Allegedly, he never participated in the
conduct of the enterprise. Nevertheless, "Morelli was found guilty of
two predicate counts of wire fraud that were part of a pattern of racke-
30, 1989, at A16, col. 1; "ras-al," The RICO Rascal, L.A. DailyJ., March 6, 1989, at 6, col. 1; "legal
monstrosity," Safire, What's Wrong With RICO: It Has Become A Legal Monstrosity, L.A. Daily J., Feb. 1,
1989, at 6, col. 3; "thermonuclear litigation," Solovy & Byman, RICO: Thermonuclear Litiation, 11
TRIAL DIPLoMAcY J. 30 (1988); "legal galaxy's blackhole," Morgan, Civil RICO: The Legal Galaxy's
Black Hole, 22 AKRON L. RExv. 107 (1988); "hurricane," Newkirk, No Way To Ride Out Hurricane RICO,
Chicago Trib., Aug. 6, 1989, § 7, at 3, col.1.
210 648 F. 2d at 381.
211 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976).
212 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1988).
213 529 F.2d at 479.
214 643 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1981).
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teering activity." 215 Morelli, too, failed to mount a constitutional attack
on the predicate acts within his RICO conviction. This is especially sig-
nificant given the fact that many RICO opponents argue that mail and
wire frauds fail to give adequate notice to potential defendants. These
vagueness challenges should properly fail.
e. Notice From State Law Predicate Acts?
One of the most recent circuits to hold RICO constitutional has
been the Sixth in United States v. Tripp.2 1 6 In a sweeping decision, the
court rejected a challenge that by incorporating state laws into "racke-
teering activity," RICO violated due process notions of fair warning.
The court noted that many other circuits "squarely rejected the argu-
ment that the federal racketeering statute is unconstitutionally vague,"
including the Sixth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Second Circuit, District of
Columbia Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Ninth Circuit.217 "Nor is there any
constitutional objection to a criminal statute that incorporates state law
for purposes of defining illegal conduct." 218 Most importantly, the court
stated, "Tripp does not allege that the state offenses involved herein them-
selves are void-for-vagueness."2l9 The court thus explicitly adopted the ra-
tionale the Supreme Court later adopted in Fort Wayne Books-RICO's
pattern may only be challenged constitutionally by subjecting the predi-
cate acts themselves to constitutional scrutiny. Further, the court re-
jected Justice Scalia's contention in H.J. Inc. that by incorporating state
law predicates into RICO, and seemingly upsetting the balance of feder-
alism between the states and the federal government, this could some-
how sway the void-for-vagueness argument.
3. Arbitrary Or Discriminatory Enforcement
Given the overwhelming weight of authority that has found that
RICO pattern provides fair warning to potential defendants, it is not sur-
prising that new challengers are suggesting that civil RICO places unfet-
tered discretion in the hands of prosecutors, judges and juries. It is true
that there is a paucity of case law analyzing this second prong of the void-
for-vagueness doctrine in the RICO context. But challengers would be
wise to note that the requirements for mounting a proper and just chal-
lenge under this second prong of the vagueness doctrine have been
clearly set out by the Supreme Court.
One author has phrased this fear of discriminatory enforcement as
"a risk of harassment" that "is greater in the civil than criminal context
because, in part, there can be no effective political oversight over the
private plaintiff."220 The argument continues that "whether the enforc-
ing party is a federal official or private citizen, the constitutional violation
exists because the statute provides inadequate prosecutorial gui-
215 Id. at 412.
216 782 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1986).
217 Id. at 42.
218 Id.
219 Id. (emphasis added).
220 Freeman & McSlarrow, supra note 38, at 1008.
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dance." 22 1 Such coitentions, however, are directly refuted by the gov-
erning Supreme Court jurisprudence. In United States v. Batchelder,222 the
Court held that the prosecutor's discretion to subject a defendant to two
different statutes, each with substantially different maximum penalties,
was not unconstitutionally vague. The statutes did not lodge arbitrary or
discriminatory discretion in the hands of prosecutors but "plainly demar-
cate[d] the range of penalties that prosecutors and judges may seek and
impose." 223
Civil RICO defendants essentially wish to argue that mail and wire
frauds, "garden variety frauds," are only prosecuted arbitrarily or dis-
criminately as civil RICO claims. 224 But as Batchelder established, such
discretion is not unfettered. The frauds maybe pursued at the state level
under theories of common law fraud, or they may be pursued as civil
RICO "patterns of racketeering activity." As in Batchelder, there are re-
ally only two prosecutory "alternatives" and two potential "sentences"
available. The real core of the alleged infirmities in RICO is that state
common law fraud is difficult to prove, and offers only single damages.
Conversely, RICO offers the lure of treble damages. But this difference
is illusory; in many states punitive damages are available to address egre-
gious fraud, and in some states these punitive damages may actually re-
sult in more, not less, damages. Nevertheless, it is the severity of the
"sentence" or damages, and not arbitrary or discriminatory discretion,
that the civil RICO defendants deplore. The Court concluded in Batchel-
der: "The prosecutor may be influenced by the penalties available upon
conviction, but this fact, standing alone, does not give rise to a violation
of the Equal Protection or Due Process Clause. ' 225 In a similar vein, the
Court noted in Fort Wayne Books, "It is true . . . that the punishments
available in a RICO prosecution are different from those for obscenity
violations. But we fail to see how this difference renders the RICO stat-
ute void for vagueness. '226
4. Circuit Court Unanimity: Before and After H.J. Inc.
The unanimity with which RICO pattern has been held constitution-
ally definite is overwhelming. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Sev-
enth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits 22 7 have all found RICO
pattern constitutionally sound. RICO pattern provides adequate notice
to potential defendants, and does not result in arbitrary or discriminatory
221 lId
222 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
223 Id. at 126.
224 Discriminatory enforcement becomes rather meaningless in the context of white-collar de-
fendants. Defendants must argue that the prosecution discriminated against a "class of defendants."
"The Equal Protection Clause prohibits selective enforcement 'based upon an unjustifiable standard
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.' " Id. at 125 n.9 (citation omitted). Surely,
white-collar defendants do not comprise such a protected class.
225 Id. at 124.
226 Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S.Ct. 916, 925 (1989).
227 Additionally the Third Circuit found § 1962(c) not vague. United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d
1191 (3d Cir. 1978). The Second Circuit found § 1962 not vague. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d
387 (2d Cir. 1979).
1990] NOTE
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
enforcement at the hands of prosecutors, judges or juries. The only dif-
ference between the controlling circuit court precedents and the present
challengers is their more genteel clientele-substantively the challenges
are identical. As these new challengers to the constitutionality of RICO
pattern properly fail, we will again say "Three cheers for Rico. "
D. Little RICO's: "You see, ... tain't no use bein' scared of any of those big
guys. The bigger they come the harder they fall. ,, 22 s
Regardless of the meaning of pattern in federal RICO, the state
RICO statutes229  stand on completely independent grounds. 230
Although some commentators have referred to these statutes as "Little
RICOs"23 '-perhaps implying they are dependent on "Big RICO" for
their sustenance-the state RICOs have their own legislative histories,
their own structure and limitations, and most importantly, their own de-
fining language. It is thus unwarranted categorically to read into the
state RICO statutes the limitations and interpretations imposed by fed-
eral courts. This is particularly true of pattern within the state RICO
statutes, which have geneses and operational definitions quite distinct
from the federal precursor. Federal RICO is thus only the precursor and
not the progenitor of state RICO statutes.
228 LrrrLE CAESAR, supra note 1, at 134.
229 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301 to -2316 (1978 & Supp. 1988); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 27 186
to 186.8 (West 1988); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-17-101 to -109 (1986 & Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 53-393 to -403 (West 1985 & Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 11 §§ 1501 to 1511
(1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.01 to .09 (West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3401 to -3414
(Harrison 1988 & Supp. 1988); HAWArI REV. STAT. §§ 842-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1988); IDAHO
CODE §§ 18-7801 to -7805 (1987 & 1989 Supp.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56-1/2 paras. 1651-60 (Smith-
Hurd 1985) (limited to narcotics); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-45-6-1 to -2 (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1988);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1351 to :1356 (West Supp. 1989) (limited to narcotics); MINN. STAT.
§§ 609.901 to .912 (Supp. 1989); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-43-1 to -11 (Supp. 1988); NEv. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 207.350 to -.520 (Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:41-1 to -6.2 (West 1982 & Supp.
1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-42-1 to -6 (1978 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 460.00 to -.80
(McKinney Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75D-1 to -14 (1987 & Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 12.1-06 to .1-08 (1985 & Supp. 1989); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2923.31 to .36 (Anderson 1987
& Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1401 to 1419 (West Supp. 1989); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 166-
715 to -735 (Butterworth 1985 & Supp. 1988); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911 (Purdon 1983 & Supp.
1989); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 7-15-1 to 11 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-12-201 to -210 (Supp. 1989);
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 to 1968 (1982 & Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-1601 to -1609 (Supp.
1989); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.82.001 to .904 (1988 & Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 946-
80 to -87 (West Supp. 1987).
230 See generally Brief of Amid Curiae In Support of Respondent [sic]-Robert K. Corbin, Attorney
General of Arizona, H.J. Inc. (No. 87-1252).
231 See Biggs & Potter, The Little Ricos: About to Grow?, 41 CONSUMER FINANCE L. Q. REP. 3 (1987).
Although conversational in tone, the piece was, perhaps, prophetic when it concluded: "Even if
Congress restricts Big RICO, the Little RICOs, unless also restricted, will remain, and will become
the focus of the plaintiff's bar." Id at 6. For more analytical pieces about state RICO legislation, see
Blakey & Walker, Emerging Issues Under the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act-Colorado's Little RICO,
18 COLO. LAw. 2077 (1989); D. Goldberg, Legislators Hear Plea to Rewrite 'Little RICO Act [California]',
L.A. DailyJ., Nov. 8, 1989 at 1, col 4.; Falanga & Barrow, Georgia's Baby RICO Comes ofAge, 25 GA. ST.
B.J. 153 (1989); Green, The Recent Changes in Florida RICO, 62 FLA. B.J. 75-77 (1988); Thorton, North
Carolina RICO: A Critical Analysis and User's Guide, 66 N.C.L. REv. 445 (1988); Gerber, "A RICO You
Can't Refuse" New York's Organized Crime Control Act, 53 BROOKLYN L. REv. 979 (1988); Frohnmayer,
RICO: Oregon's Message to Organized Crime, 18 WILLAME'rE L. REV. 1, 5 (1982); Note, Plaintiffs Under
Florida RICO Must Meet Traditional Equity Requirements When Seeking Temporary Injunctions to Safeguard
Assets-Finkelstein v. Southeast Bank, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 975 (1987).
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1. State RICO "Patterns": "This ain't no picnic. ",232
It has been repeatedly asserted that the term patern is only limited
by, but not defined in section 1961(5). Among the states, however, sev-
eral have chosen not to use the pattern concept at all.23 3 Others pro-
scribe a "pattern of corrupt activity," 23 4 a "pattern of criminal
activity," 23 5 a "pattern of unlawful activity," 23 6 or a "pattern of criminal
profiteering activity."'23 7 Two states further limit the ambit of their stat-
utes by prohibiting a "pattern of drug racketeering activity" and a "pat-
tern of narcotics activity."' 238 Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of
the states-twenty-six of twenty-nine-utilize the pattern concept to
form the heart of their state RICO statute. Indeed most state legisla-
tures-eighteen of twenty-nine-prohibit a "pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity," 23 9 debunking the myth that only a federal Congress applied such
language.
232 LrrrLE CAESAR, supra note 1, at 172.
233 See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301 to -2316 (1978 & Supp. 1988), HAWAIi Rav. STAT.
§§ 842-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1988), R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-15-1 to -11 (1985). Nevada utilizes the
term pattern in a non-exclusive or illustrative fashion. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 207.390 (Michie 1986)
(" 'Racketeering activity' means engaging in at least two crimes related to racketeering that have the
same or similar pattern, intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission, or are
otherwise related by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents ...").
234 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.31(E) (Anderson 1987 & Supp. 1988) (" 'Pattern of Corrupt
Activity' means two or more incidents of corrupt activity, whether or not there has been a prior
conviction, that are related to the affairs of the same enterprise, are not isolated, and are not so
closely related to each other and connected in time and place that they constitute a single event.").
235 MINN. STAT. § 609.902 Subd. 6 (Supp. 1989) (" 'Pattern of criminal activity' means conduct
constituting three or more criminal acts that: (1) were committed within ten years of the commence-
ment of the criminal proceeding; (2) are neither isolated incidents, nor so closely related and con-
nected in point of time or circumstance of commission as to constitute a single criminal offense; and
(3) were either: (i) related to one another through a common scheme or plan or a shared criminal
purpose or (ii) committed, solicited, requested, importuned, or intentionally aided by persons acting
with the mental culpability required for the commission of the criminal acts and associated with or in
an enterprise involved in those activities."); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-43-3(d) (Supp. 1988) (same).
236 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1602(3) (Supp. 1989) (" 'Pattern of unlawful activity' means engag-
ing in conduct which constitutes the commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity, which
episodes are not isolated, but have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken to-
gether, the episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and be related either to each
other or to the enterprise...).
237 CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.2(b) (West 1988) (" 'Pattern of criminal profiteering activity' means
engaging in at least two incidents of criminal profiteering, as defined by this act, which meet the
following requirements: (1) Have the same or a similar purpose, result, principals, victims or meth-
ods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics; (2) Are not iso-
lated events; (3) Were committed as a criminal activity of organized crime."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.82.010(15) (1988 & Supp. 1989) (" 'Pattern of criminal profiteering activity' means engaging in
at least three acts of criminal profiteering ... In order to constitute a pattern, the three acts must
have the same or similar intent, results, accomplices, principals, victims, or methods of commission,
or be otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics including a nexus to the same enter-
prise, and must not be isolated events ...).
238 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, 1653(b) (Smith-Hurd 1985) ("Pattern of narcotics activity means
two or more acts .. ."); LA. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 15:1352(c) (West Supp. 1989) (" 'Pattern of drug
racketeering activity' means engaging in at least two incidents...").
239 CoLo. R,. STAT. § 18-17-103(3) (1986 & Supp. 1988) (" 'Pattern of racketeering activity'
means engaging in at least two acts of racketeering activity which are related to the conduct of the
enterprise, if at least one of such acts occurred in this state afterJuly 1, 1981, and if the last of such
acts occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after a prior act of racketeer-
ing activity."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-394(e) (West 1985 & Supp. 1989) (" 'Pattern of racke-
teering activity' means engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering activity that have the same
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Furthermore, many of the state RICO statutes are not susceptible to
challenges that pattern limitations are inherently vague; many of the
or similar purposes, results, participants, victims or methods of commission or otherwise are interre-
lated by distinguishing characteristics, including a nexus to the same enterprise, and are not isolated
incidents, provided the latter or last of such incidents occurred after October 1, 1982, and within five
years after a prior incident of racketeering activity."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1502(5) (1987)
(" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' shall mean two or more incidents of conduct, a. that: 1. constitute
racketeering activity; 2. are related to the affairs of the enterprise 3. are not so closely related to each
other and connected in point of time and place that they constitute a single event.. ."); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 895.02(4) (West Supp. 1989) (" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' means engaging in at least
two incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices,
victims, or methods of commission or that otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteris-
tics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one of such incidents occurred after the effective
date of this act and that the last of such incidents occurred within 5 years after a prior incident of
racketeering conduct."); GA. Code Ann. § 16-14-3(8) (Harrison 1988 & Supp. 1988) (" 'Pattern of
racketeering activity' means engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering activity that have the
same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents .. ."); IDAHO CODE § 18-
7803(d) (1987 & Supp. 1989) (" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' means engaging in at least two (2)
incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims
or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not
isolated incidents. . ."); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1[.014] (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1988) ("... intent
[singular], result, accomplice, victim, or method of commission. . ."); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-1(d)
(West 1982 & Supp. 1989) (" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' requires (1) Engaging in at least two
incidents of racketeering conduct one of which shall have occurred after the effective date of this act
and the last of which shall have occurred within 10 years (excluding any period of imprisonment)
after a prior incident of racketeering activity; and (2) A showing that the incidents of racketeering
activity embrace criminal conduct that has either the same or similar purposes, results, participants
or victims or methods of commission or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics
and are not isolated events."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42-3(D) (1978 & Supp. 1988) (" 'Pattern of
racketeering activity' means engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering with the intent of
accomplishing any of the prohibited activities set forth in Subsections A through D of Section 30-42-
4 NMSA 1978; provided at least one of the incidents occurred after the effective date of the Racket-
eer Act and the last of which occurred Within five years after the commission of a prior incident of
racketeering."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.10(4) (McKinney Supp. 1988) (" 'Pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity' means conduct engaged in by persons charged in an enterprise corruption count constituting
three or more criminal acts that: (a) were committed within ten years of the commencement of the
criminal action; (b) are neither isolated incidents, nor so closely related and connected in point of
time or circumstance of commission as to constitute a criminal offense or criminal transaction, as
those terms are defined in section 40. 10 of the criminal procedure law; and (c) are either (i) related
to one another through a common scheme or plan or (ii) were committed, solicited, requested,
importuned or intentionally aided by persons acting with the mental culpability required for the
commission thereof and adjudicated with or in the criminal enterprise."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-
3(b) (1987 & Supp. 1988) (" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' means engaging in at least two inci-
dents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar purposes, results, accomplices, victims, or
methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not
isolated and unrelated incidents..."); N.D. CEr. CODE § 12.1-06.1-01.1(d) (1985 & Supp. 1989)
(" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity .. ."); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. § 1402(5) (West Supp. 1989) (" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' means one or more
occasions of conduct: a. that include the following: (1) constitute racketeering activity, (2) are related
to the affairs of the enterprise, (3) are not isolated, and (4) are not so closely related to each other
and connected in point of time and place that they constitute a single event..."); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 166.715(4) (Butterworth 1985 & Supp. 1988) (" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' means engaging
in at least two incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results, accom-
plices, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteris-
tics, including a nexus to the same enterprise, and are not isolated incidents .. ."); PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 911 (h)(4) (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1988) (" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' refers to a course
of conduct requiring two or more acts of racketeering activity . . ."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-
203(b) (1989) (" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' means engaging in at least two (2) incidents of
racketeering that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods other-
wise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents . . ."); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 946.82(3) (West Supp. 1987) (" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' means engaging in at least
three incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices,
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states explicitly define pattern. Thus, when Florida's RICO statute says
pattern "means.. ."240 it has exactly defined the term pattern. Pattern is
similarly unassailable on grounds of vagueness in twenty-three of the
twenty-nine states. 241 Two states say pattern "requires" 242 following the
federal RICO limitation, while Pennsylvania says "refers." 243 Further-
more, eight states have included a liberal construction clause to guide
the state's judiciary.244 Pattern limitations are a uniquely federal crea-
ture; overwhelmingly the states have adopted exact definitions of "pat-
tern," rendering the vagueness debate moot for state purposes.
2. State RICO & "Continuity": "Bad business to quit on me... One guy
tried that on me once. ",245
Within federal RICO, "acts" are used as the unit for counting predi-
cate offenses. 246 The states conversely have chosen a wider array of
terms for quantifying the continuity prong of "pattern." Sixteen states
expressly count "incidents" 247 while others count "crimes," 248 "occa-
sions" 249 and "episodes." 250 Ten states utilize "acts" 25 1 as the standard
for establishing "continuity." Such a prevalence of the terms "acts" and
"incidents" can only be explained by the requirement that they "not be
isolated incidents" or "events" (twenty-three states).252 This focus on
separate acts or incidents is more clearly demonstrated by five of the
newest statutes which require that the acts "are not so closely related to
each other and connected in time and place that they constitute a single
event. ' 253 To the extent that Federal RICO's legislative history has
wrongly been interpreted to limit Title X's application to the relatedness
prong, the textual choices of the states in opting for "incidents," "epi-
sodes" and "crimes" as "not to be isolated," should preclude the wrong-
ful application of such analysis to the states. 254
victims or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics
240 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.02(4) (West Supp. 1989), supra note 229.
241 See generally supra note 229.
242 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 41-1(d) (West 1982 & Supp. 1989), N.D. CENT. CODE § 2.1-06.1-
01.1(d) (1985 & Supp. 1989), supra note 229.
243 See PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 911(h)(4) (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1988), supra note 227.
244 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWs § 7-15-10 (1985) ("The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally
construed to effectuate its purpose.").
245 LrrrLE C sstA, supra note 1, at 176 n.6.
246 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).
247 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.2(b) (West 1988), supra note 227.
248 See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 460.10(4) (McKinney Supp. 1988), supra note 229.
249 See OmLA. STAT. ANN. § 1402(5) (West Supp. 1989), supra note 229.
250 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1602(3) (Supp. 1989), supra note 226.
251 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-17-103(3) (1986 & Supp. 1988), supra note 229.
252 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.02(4) (West Supp. 1989), supra note 229.
253 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1502(5) (1987), supra note 229.
254 The H.J Inc. majority's confusion about the meaning of the phrase "and are not isolated acts"
has not resulted in merely harmless error. Several state courts relied on this interpretation of the
phrase in H.J. Inc. to shape their own state's "little" RICO jurisprudence. Oregon, for instance, in
Computer Concepts v. Brandt overlooked the phrase "and are not isolated incidents" and based on
H.J. Inc.'s erroneous dicta concluded:
mhe legislature chose to include the element of "relationship" and exclude "continuity."
We cannot ignore the plain meaning of unambiguous words in a statute. We hold that
the "pattern of racketeering" element in an ORICO claim is satisfied by two incidents of
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3. State RICO & "Relationship": "I ain't gonna spill anything... You
think I want my neck stretched?" 255
Federal RICO, as recognized by the Court in Sedima and H.J. Inc.,
has incorporated the "relationship prong" of pattern through its legisla-
tive history. The states, more often than not, explicitly define this prong
within its provisions. Indeed, twenty-four of the states explicitly mention
the word "related" or "interrelated" when defining "pattern. '256 The
typical state requires that a pattern is demonstrated by acts which "have
the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of
commission or otherwise are "interrelated by distinguishing characteris-
tics." 257 Moreover, several states have additionally required the acts to
have a "nexus to the same enterprise." 25 8 Therefore, when justice Scalia
and his minority faction suggest that Tide X is irrelevant for the interpre-
tation of pattern within Tide IX, this analysis has no bearing on the state
RICO statutes which directly incorporate the "relationship" prong into
the elements of state RICO. Moreover, the Court would be wise to rec-
ognize the intelligence of the states, of which more than eighty per cent
have found Title X's language of "relationship" compelling and adopted
it in twenty-four separate state legislatures. 25 9
Temporal "relationship" is also governed independently by the
states. For instance, while federal RICO requires "at least two acts" be
committed "within ten years" of one another,260 Pennsylvania has no
time limitation at all. 26 ' Other states (New York, Washington, and Wis-
consin) require "three acts." 262 Tennessee requires that the acts be com-
mitted within two years of one another, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho,
Georgia and North Carolina, four years, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah and Washington, five years,
Ohio, six years, and Wisconsin, seven years. 263 The rest follow the fed-
eral statute.264
"racketeering activity," interrelated... The "continuity" element in the RICO statute is not
an element under ORICO.
Computer Concepts v. Brandt, 98 Or. App. 618, 780 P.2d 249, 256 (1989). This oversight may be
remedied by other states grasping the plain meaning of the phrase "are not isolated acts": acts that
are not isolated are, or were, continuous. See also Continuity Plus Relationship, supra note 119, at 183
n.183 ("since section 3575(e) also requires that the crimes be not 'isolated,' continuity is addressed
as well").
255 LrrrLE CAESAR, supra note 1, at 180 n.48.
256 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1502(5) (1987), supra note 229.
257 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 155.715(4) (Butterworth 1985 & Supp. 1988), supra note 229.
258 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-394(e) (West 1985 & Supp. 1989), supra note 229.
259 See supra note 229.
260 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
261 See PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 911(h)(4) (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1989), supra note 229.
262 See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 460.10(4) (McKinney Supp. 1988); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 946.82(3) (West
Supp. 1987), supra note 229; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.010(15) (1988 & Supp. 1989), supra
note 229.
263 See generally supra note 229.
264 See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-1(d) (West 1982 & Supp. 1989), supra note 229.
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E. Prospective Application: "Who stands here? Yeah, the back door.. ?
Kinda forgot that, didn't youP'" 265
One particularly clever argument would find pattern vague only pro-
spectively. The pragmatics of such an approach are obvious; no judge
relishes the thought of turning Carmine Persico, Anthony Salerno, nor
members of the white supremacist "Order" loose on society. Assuming,
arguendo, that pattern could be found void-for-vagueness, is such a pro-
spective application constitutionally circumspect? One Supreme Court
case, Wainwright v. Stone,266 would seem to answer affirmatively.
In Wainwright, a Florida statute proscribing "abominable and detest-
able crime against nature, either with mankind or beast" had previously
been held constitutionally definite by the Florida Supreme Court. After
the conviction of the defendant Stone, the Florida Supreme Court held
prospectively that oral and anal sexual activity did not appear on the face of
the statute, and that the statute was void-for-vagueness and uncer-
tainty.267 The defendant sought federal habeas corpus relief on the
grounds that this prospective application of the vagueness doctrine was
unconstitutional. 268 The Supreme Court thus faced the issue of whether
prior judicial "gloss" by the Florida Supreme Court had made Stone's
conviction under the statute sufficiently definite, so that Florida's new
"gloss" on the statute need be applied only prospectively. The Court
held that when the defendants committed their acts, they were on clear
notice that their conduct was criminal under the statute as then con-
strued (its "gloss"). 2 6 9 Thus, the Florida Supreme Court's judgment to
not apply the void-for-vagueness holding retroactively, but only prospec-
tively, did not deprive Stone of fair warning or notice.
What then does the application of Wainwright hold for RICO? Seem-
ingly, as long as the judicial "gloss" of RICO was firmly established at
the time of conviction, there is no rationale to apply vagueness holdings
retroactively. The defendants were all on notice that their activity was
definitely proscribed by the statute-the predicate acts under RICO were
all sufficiently defined as well. Thus, in order for a court to justify retro-
active application of vagueness, that court would have to find (1) that the
judicial "gloss" of RICO pattern was indefinite at the time of conviction,
and (2) that the predicate offense and its accompanying "gloss" were in-
dependently uncertain. Therein lies the rub; such a dual finding by a
court is certainly problematic. In all likelihood, RICO's darkest and most
heinous criminals will remain behind bars, regardless of "pattern's"
vagueness (or definiteness).
Another twist to this prospective application argument is to apply
RICO prospectively only for criminal penalties under section 1963, and
hold RICO unconstitutional retroactively for civil redress under section
265 LrrrLE CAsAR, supra note 1, at 75.
266 414 U.S. 21 (1973).
267 Id at 22.
268 Id
269" Id at 23-24.
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1964.270 One immediate disadvantage of such an action is that it would
eliminate the possibility of treble damages for the nearly 5000 pending
cases with billions of dollars in potential judgments. This is, of course,
clearly untenable. Nevertheless, proponents of such a distinction may
point to Justice Cardozo's famous Sunburst 271 decision in support. Sun-
burst held that for civil statutes, at least, a state may constitutionally apply
its findings retroactively or prospectively. 272 Besides Wainwright there is
little to support such a holding in the realm of criminal statutes. Such an
asymmetric approach is counter-intuitive; moreover, it breaks with prece-
dent.273 The federal courts have held that RICO's criminal and civil pro-
visions must be construed in pari materia.274 Moreover, Sunburst does not
hold that part of the identical statute may be applied prospectively, and
the remainder retroactively. Rather, RICO pattern must be applied con-
sistently in both its criminal and civil applications. It is doubtful, there-
fore, that the Court will leave the "back door" unattended; efforts to apply
vagueness to RICO pattern retroactively should properly be thwarted by
the judiciary.
IV. Policy Choices Implicit in Vagueness Challenge
Implicit within Justice Scalia's argument are at least two underlying
rationales, or motivations for finding pattern void-for-vagueness. First, a
lingering resentment that RICO has not been limited to members of "or-
ganized crime"-the "mafia." Second, fear that by supplanting state
common law remedies, RICO violates notions of federalism or state
autonomy.
A. Organized Crime Requirement: "Do you expect me
to fraternize with crooks?" 275
The organized crime requirement was addressed repeatedly in the
amicus briefs of H.J. Inc.276 Justice Scalia was not a member of the Court
270 Congressman Boucher's comments, although in the context of legislative reform, would apply
equally to judicial efforts to circumscribe RICO: "[T]here is no sentiment to limit RICO on the
criminal side." N.Y. Times, March 12, 1989, at C2, col. 1.
271 Great Northern R.R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932).
272 Id. at 365 ("[It] may hold to the ancient dogma that the law declared by its courts had a
Platonic or ideal existence before the act of declaration, in which event the discredited declaration
will be viewed as if it had never been, and the reconsidered declaration as the law from the
beginning.").
273 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985).
274 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
275 LrrrLE CAEsAR, supra note 1, at 79. Surely, much of the outrage expressed by "legitimate"
businessmen has been levelled at the "racketeer" label affixed to them. For a fascinating historical
perspective, Chaplinsky's "fighting words" doctrine should be read. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942) ("You are a God damned racketeer" was sustained as a violation of New
Hampshire statute; no first amendment protection was accorded the "fighting words").
276 See generally Brief for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 3, H.J. Inc. (No. 87-1252); Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents at 34; Brief for the National Association of Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 3 (a particularly novel and analytical brief); Brief for the Washington
Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents as Amid Curiae at 3; Brief for the Chamber of Com-
merce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 6 (attempted compromise position). With
the exception of the National Association of Manufacturers Brief, these Amici brought almost no
substantive content to the debate that had not already been litigated in Sedima.
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in Sedima, however, he similarly noted that "the prologue of the statute
.. .describes a relatively narrow focus upon 'organized crime.'"277
Chief Justice Rehnquist, too, in a speech to the Brookings Institution
made in April 1989 said "I think the time has arrived for Congress to
enact amendments to civil RICO to limit its scope to the sort of wrongs
that are connected to organized crime. ' 278 At best then these comments
are veiled invective, linguistic palliative designed to soothe their sense of
rejection-at worst, unprincipled attempts to overrule Sedima with an 'end
run. If organized crime's nexus is read as the implicit motivation of the
four votes in favor ofJustice Scalia's concurrence, Justice Brennan's ma-
jority opinion becomes much more powerful indeed. Section-III of the
opinion is devoted entirely to the rejection of an organized crime nexus.
Before examining the specifics, Justice Brennan noted "the argument for
reading an organized crime limitation into RICO's pattern concept ... is
at odds with the tenor of legislative history." 279 Moreover, in the eight
succeeding paragraphs the Justice discussed at least seven reasons why
the majority decision refused to "invent a rule ... that requires .. .an
organized crime nexus." 280 Suffice it to say, following on the heels of
Turkette28s and Sedima,282 and the majority in H.J. Inc., Justice Scalia's
views suggesting an organized crime nexus can only be viewed as "sour
grapes" rationalizing. Surely, a more principled analysis would require
all those who engage in a pattern of racketeering acts to 'fraternize with
crooks" while serving their sentences: both members of the "mafia" and
"conventional" white-collar criminals alike.
B. RICO Floodgates: "Sure, Boss, pretty soon you'll be
running the whole town. " 28 3
Justice Scalia's second rationale lamented that "RICO has 'quite
simply revolutionize[d] private litigation' and 'validate[d] the federaliza-
tion of broad areas of state common law of frauds.' "284 The ChiefJus-
277 109 S. Ct. at 2908 (citing Statement of Findings and Purpose, The Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23.).
278 Rehnquist, Reforming Diversity Jurisdiction and Civil RICO, 21 St. Mary's L.J. 5, 13 (1989) (origi-
nally presented at the Brookings Institution's Eleventh Seminar on the Administration of Justice,
Apr. 7, 1989), reprinted in 9 RICO L. REP. 923, 925 (1988).
279 109 S. Ct. at 2903.
280 Id at 2902-05 ((1) RICO may apply to an individual alone (2) no such restrictions are explic-
itly stated (3) Title X's language indicates liability beyond organized crime (4) Senator's in floor
debate recognized RICO's wide application (5) Courts should not frame legislation (6) Organized
crime was the focus of, but not the chief limitation of RICO (7) Congress felt organized crime was
impossible to define).
281 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87 ("As the hearings and legislative debates
reveal, Congress was well aware of the fear that RICO would 'mov[e] large substantive areas for-
merly totally within the police power of the State into the Federal realm.' In the face of these objec-
tions Congress nonetheless proceeded to enact the measure, knowing that it would alter somewhat
the role of the Federal Government in the war against organized crime and that the alterations
would entail prosecutions involving acts of racketeering that are also crimes under state law. There
is no argument that Congress acted beyond its power in so'doing. That being the case the courts are
without authority to restrict the application of the statute.").
282 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
283 LrrTLE CA~sAR, supra note 1, at 179 n.46.
284 HJ. Inc. v. Nothwestem Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. at 2909 (citing Marshall, J., in Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 501 (1985)).
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tice similarly bemoaned in his Brookings Institution speech, "I do think
that the imposition of some limitations on civil RICO actions is required
so that federal courts are not required to duplicate the efforts of the state
courts. No one doubts that the victim of a fraudulent scheme should be
able to obtain redress in a court. The question is under what circum-
stances should that take place in a federal court?" 28 5 The federalism at-
tack does seem to voice two differing concerns. "Duplicat[ing] the
efforts of the state courts" is really just another way of couching fears
that RICO claims are burgeoning and threaten to overwhelm federal
dockets. 286
Since civil RICO claims have levelled off at approximately 100 cases
a month, and constitute less than 0.5% of the federal docket, 287 this ar-
gument is a "red herring." 288 Indeed, the "burgeoning court dockets"
argument is an old ploy used by the "strict constructionists" to justify
federal retrenchment on a variety of fronts: "antitrust" threatened to
overwhelm the federal judiciary in the early 80s, asbestos litigation in the
mid-80s, racial discrimination suits in the late 80s.289 Civil RICO litiga-
tion is a minute part of the federal docket and will remain so. Those who
suggest otherwise have "cried wolf" repeatedly throughout the 1980s.
Their cries have no veracity as we enter the 1990s; they only smack of
active judicial retrenchment. No, RICO will not be "running the whole
town" but will continue to represent a small fraction of a percent of the
federal judicial caseload.
C. Federalism: "I'm takin' over this territory.., from now
on its all mine." 290
The second concern, couched in this asserted violation of federal-
ism, 291 is that RICO supplants state common law and turns "garden-vari-
285 Rehnquist, supra note 278, at 12-13.
286 Id. at 12.
287 Blakey, Study of Allegations of Litigation Abuse, 5 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) 6 (June 20, 1989)
("Mhe Business/Labor Coalition for Civil RICO Reform has produced a list of 53 cases it terms
"abusive." The first case was filed in January 1988. Between December 1979 and January 1988,
approximately 1,910,520 cases were filed in federal district courts. Of that number, approximately
2,742 were RICO filings. These "abusive" cases, therefore constitute only 0.003 percent of total
filings, and 1.9 percent of the RICO filings.").
288 See, e.g., Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of North America, 824 F.2d 1349, 1354 (3d Cir.
1987) ("While we are touched by defendant's concern for our workload, we believe that Sedima
warns us not to construe RICO in a limited way out of a desire to prevent the statute from reaching
people other than organized criminals.").
289 Indeed, a new scapegoat likely will soon be intellectual property law. Since the formation of a
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, over 80%6 of patent infringement suits are being
upheld, rather than disallowed. The Battle Raging Over Intellectual Property, Bus. WiK., May 22, 1989, at
78-84. Consequently huge judgments in stultifying numbers have begun to sprout from the intellec-
tual property arena. For an excellent analysis of the intersection of RICO and intellectual property,
see Hale, Civil RICO and Intellectual Property After Sedima, 56 Miss. L.J. 567 (1986). For an opposed
but regrettably unscholarly analysis, see Note, The Proper Application of Civil RICO to Patent Fraud, 96
YALE LJ. 1323 (1987).
290 LrrrLE CEAsAR, supra note I, at 130.
291 Not coincidentally, one of the leading jurists espousing the virtues of federalism has been
Robert Bork. It is possible formerJudge Bork will lead the assault on pattern being void-for-vague-
ness. See Wall St.J., Nov. 6, 1989, at B6, col. 5 ("Mr. Bork, whose nomination to the Supreme Court
was scuttled by the Senate in 1987, is expected to lead the constitutional challenge to the use of the
federal racketeering law in the case against Mr. Wallach [convicted of RICO fraud in the Wedtech
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ety" contract disputes into federal racketeering violations. This second
concern touches at the heart of vertical federalism, and contains much
that is true. Certainly some "garden-variety" contract disputes are
turned into federal racketeering violations29 2L-ostensibly, those contract
disputes that evidence a pattern of racketeering activity and violate sec-
tions 1962(a), (b), (c), or (d). Nevertheless, just because the behavior of
the defendant has been "elevated" to a federal "pattern," is it necessarily
true that state common law has been supplanted? Senator McClellan and
the congressional framers answered just such claims in the negative when
they expressly incorporated into the legislative history of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1969: "Nothing in [RICO] shall supercede any
provision of Federal, State, or other law imposing criminal penalties or
affording civil remedies in addition to those provided for."295 RICO, like
many other federal criminal statutes, supplements, not supplants state
common law. This statutory scheme was adopted by Congress for sev-
eral reasons.
First, the sophisticated nature of modem criminal transactions was
viewed to be largely beyond the competent enforcement powers of the
states. Securities markets, commodities markets, international account-
ing practices, and international banking are only some of the electronic
transactions largely beyond the police powers of the states. Second, to
the extent civil RICO supplements, and not supplants, state common
law-principally fraud remedies-state redress is completely opera-
tive.294 The state scheme does not preclude anyone from being indicted,
tried, or convicted if the federal RICO charges are transferred or dis-
missed. In this manner, federalism principles are not exclusively
abridged as in violations of the Federal Tax Code or Sherman Anti-Trust
Act. Third, there is ample precedent in the federal criminal scheme for
this supplemental approach. A notable example of this supplemental, or
dual, approach is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974.295 Fourth, philosophically the vertical scheme is a repugnant and
antiquated approach. To the extent that state boundaries become mean-
scandal] ... RICO has become an issue for many conservatives, who say that the law is unconstitu-
tionally vague... 'RICO is an issue (Mr. Bork) is very interested in,' Mr. Riordan [criminal defense
lawyer for Wallach] said. 'If hejoins this effort, it is dear that he is going to carry the laboring oar on
that question.' ").
292 Judge Pratt, in dissent, best adressed this notion of "garden variety" disputes in Furman v.
Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub noa. Joel v. Cirrito, 473 U.S.
922 (1985), appeal after remand, 828 F.2d 898 (2nd. Cir. 1987):
[Congress] provided no exception for businessmen, for white collar workers, for bankers or
for stockbrokers. If the conduct of such people can sometimes be fairly characterized as
"garden variety fraud," we can only conclude that by the RICO statute Congress has pro-
vided an additional means to weed that "garden" of its fraud. It is almost too obvious to
require statement, but fraud is fraud, whether it is committed by a hit man for organized
crime or by the President of a Wall Street brokerage firm.
Id. at 529.
293 See 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
294 Haroco v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 284, 292 (7th Cir. 1984),
aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985) ("Congress enacted RICO in order to supplement, not supplant, the
available remedies since it thought those remedies offered too little protection for the victims.").
295 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1988) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to alter, amend, mod-
ify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States...").
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ingless in the pursuit of crime, that electronic and computerized informa-
tion cross international boundaries in seconds, the notion that state
governments can govern this flow of money and information is an anti-
quated fallacy. Because technological growth and the flow of informa-
tion develops exponentially, while our state enforcement mechanisms
barely grow geometrically (indeed shrink in real terms), this approach
becomes repugnant. It only serves to insulate interstate and interna-
tional enterprises from an effective policing, regulatory and prosecutorial
mechanism. Indeed, this realization prompted Congress to adopt new
means including the enforcement of remedial measures-the private at-
torney general provisions of RICO were an integral component of this
new statutory scheme.296
Federalism is the cloak of the recent "pre-New Deal" judicial activ-
ists. Like their predecessor of 50 years ago, they claim allegiance to strict
constructionist doctrines. Of course, in choosing not to change, they have cho-
sen. Insulation of the status quo always involves a choice: in this case,
not to react to the turbulent forces at work in our age.297 Perhaps Ros-
coe Pound best perceived the pendulum-like swing of judicial activism:
from change to unchange, from status alterare to status quo, from wealth
transfer to wealth entrenchment. 298 The pendulum swings with choice.
Even when the pendulum has slowed to an apparent stasis, it is at once
both swinging towards a future change, and swinging from a recent past.
E. Congressional Reform: "They thought they hit the target, Boss, but bullets
just bounce off you." 299
Spurred on by the AFL-CIO, the ACLU, the Securities Industries
Association, the American Bankers Association, and the American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants, bills have been introduced in both
houses of Congress to "defang" RICO. Rather than a measured and
principled approach to reform, however, the bills have reflected the
"grab bag" nature of the special interests that drafted them.300 And the
results have been little more successful than the level of organization.30'
296 See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983) ("The legislative history [of RICO]
clearly demonstrates that ... [it] was intended to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for
an assault upon organized crime and its economic roots.").
297 Charles L. Black castigated, "U]udicial restraint carried far enough becomes judicial catatonia,
distinguishable only by the specialist from death." C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 2 (1960).
A more realistic view, argues Black, is that "[a] law which is to be applied by a court, but is not to be
interpreted by a court, is a solecism simply unknown to our conceptions of legality and the legal
process." Id. at 15.
298 See generally R. POUND III, CRIMINALJUSTICE IN AMERICA (1930).
299 LrrrLE CAESAR, supra note 1, at 179 n.38.
300 The best analysis of several prior unsuccessful attempts at RICO reform is Goldsmith, Civil
RICO Reform: The Basis for Compromise, 71 MINN. L. REV. 827 (1987). A comprehensive review and
analysis of current RICO reform efforts can be found in Blakey, Possible Amendments to the 'RICO Re-
form Act of 1989'(HR 1046), 5 Civil RICO Rep. (BNA) 1 (Aug. 8, 1989), and more recently an entire
symposium issue of the Vanderbilt Law Review was devoted to the prospect and rationale of RICO
reform. Reforming RICO: If Why, and How?, 43 VAND. L. REv. 621-1101 (1990).
301 See, e.g., Wall St.J., Nov. 9, 1989, at A18, col. 1:
Now,just 11 months later, the RICO reform juggernaut is running out of steam... making
it unlikely that Congress will pass any RICO legislation this year. The near reversal of the
RICO revision lobby's fortunes is a case study of how a high-powered, well-funded lobby-
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Analytically the failure of this reform movement-or triumph of RICO-
can be traced to three factors. First, the "grab bag" approach to reform
necessarily included a great deal of excess baggage. One such overindul-
gence was retroactivity.30 2 Second, the Savings & Loan scandals, as well
as the ruckus on Wall Street and LaSalle Street, have underscored the
need for strong and effective remedies against institutional fraud. In-
deed, Rep. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.), has declared, "I'll be damned if I
let big fat cats rip off American people."30 3 This perception of our finan-
cial capitals as hotbeds of corruption, will preclude our political capitol
from enacting RICO reform in the near future.
Of course the previous two arguments may be overstating the case.
Shortly after the decision in H.J. Inc. was announced, odds could be
taken in any political conference that RICO would be prudently trimmed
before Christmas time. Shortly afterwards, however, the political sup-
porters of RICO reform were linked to the financial abuses Representa-
tive Conyers had warned about. Senator DeConcini was linked to
Lincoln Savings and Loan's president, Mr. Keating, and RICO reform
affectionately was termed the "Keating bail-out bill." 3 4 The political
tide was stemmed.30 5
In 1990, Rep. William J. Hughes (D-N.J.), Chair of the House Sub-
committee on Crime, proposed- a middle ground termed the "gate
keeper" provision.30 6 Fueled by a genuine attempt to refine the reach
ing effort can be derailed. Three factors hurt the movement. First, seemingly unconnected
scandals, mainly in the savings-and-loan industry, have made Congress uneasy about ap-
pearing to go easy on white-collar crime. Second, the RICO issue brought out advocates
with unusually direct financial interests in the bill, making lawmakers even more wary of
being accused of bailing out special interests. Finally, RICO revision advocates insisted that
narrowing of the civil RICO law be made retroactive, a point their opponents seized upon
as too greedy..
Early this year, Senator Dennis DeConcini, a member of the judiciary panel, became
the chief sponsor of the RICO revision bill... Then the savings-and-loan crisis mired Sen.
DeConcini in questions about his intervention with regulators on behalf of Charles Keat-
ings's Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, whose collapse is expected to cost taxpayers
about $2 billion. Sen. DeConcini had received $55,000 in campaign contributions from Mr.
Keating or his associates, while top campaign aides got $50 million in real-estate loans from
Lincoln. With three civil RICO suits pending against Mr. Keating... foes of RICO revision
quickly tagged the legislation "the Keating bail-out bill."
302 Apparently, this author was not the only one to view retroactivity as an "indulgence." Benja-
minJ. Stein, when considering the prospect of RICO reform, had written in BARRON's,July 3, 1989,
at 14: "The Congress like a Dark Ages pope, will grant retroactive indulgences, plenary and eternal,
in fraud, bribes, looting, inside trading, cheating the government and stock manipulators-with no
counterveiling gain at all except to the treasuries of individual legislators."
303 Legal Times,July 10, 1989, at 17. Similarly, the Legal Times concluded," So while RICO may
prod congressional action, there is uncertain political mileage foi either party in laminating the act."
Id at 17.
304 See Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 1989, at 12, col. 4. Not coincidentally, two of DeConcini's aides
received more than $50 million in real estate loans from Keating's Lincoln Savings and Loan. Chi-
cago Trib., Oct. 16, 1989, at A14, col. 1.
305 See Pitt & Johnson, RICO Decision Fans the Fire That Won't Go Out, Manhattan Law., July 18,
1989, at 13 ("Several RICO revision bills, similar to compromise legislation that nearly gained ap-
proval in the last session of Congress, have been introduced in the House and Senate. The H.J. Inc.
majority and concurring opinions called for legislative reform. Unfortunately, this reform will not
galvanize Capitol Hill in the same manner, as say, flag burning. Prosecutors have been diligent in
protecting RICO as an effective weapon; consumer groups want this tool against corporate
defendants.").
306 Hughes, RICO Reform: How Much is Needed, 43 VAND. L. REv. 643, 646-49 (1990).
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and use of civil RICO, rather than eviscerate civil RICO like the Boucher
bill, the "gate keeper" provision seeks to thwart the application of RICO
to routine corporate fraud.A0 7 At the same time egregious criminal activ-
ity for which there are previous criminal convictions are automatically let
through the "gates." The "gate keeper" provision shall operate through
a formal hearing where eggregious fraudulent activity for which no crimi-
nal convictions have been obtained are nonetheless let through the
"gates" if: (1) the remedy is appropriate because of the signifigance of
the loss to plaintiff; (2) the defendant's conduct was central to the harm;
and (3) the remedy is needed to deter criminal conduct. This middle-
ground approach has even been endorsed by the drafter of the original
RICO bill.30 8
V. Catastrophic Consequences: "Rico is dead.. .309
[wJhere is the guardian angel?"310
A. S&L Crisis
If the Court were to sound the death-knell of RICO by finding pat-
tern unconstitutionally vague, the reverberations would be heard far
wider than America's corporate boardrooms. American consumers
would ultimately pick up the tab for the widespread fraud denied RICO
redress. As even Chief Justice Rehnquist has previously noted, white-
collar crime in America is widespread and pervasive.3 11 The Justice De-
partment has affixed a price tag of $200 billion to the crime.312 This
number perhaps drastically underestimates the share consumers will ulti-
mately pay in aiding our failing Savings & Loan industry. 31 3 President
Bush's plan may, in sum, cost consumers upwards of $157 billion.3 14
307 The RICO Amendments Act of 1990, H.R. 5111, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). H.R. 5111
also codifies the Supreme Court's H.J. Inc. "continuity plus relationship" test for pattern; explicitly
makes the first amendment applicable to RICO; explicitly makes Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 11 applicable
to frivilous-factually or legally unsupportable claims-RICO suits; explicitly extends Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. Rule 9(b) (pleading fraud with particularity) to all elements of RICO; changes the burden of
proof in civil litigation under.RICO from preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing
evidence; restricts jurisdiction over civil RICO litigation to exculsively the federal courts; and applies
retroactively to conduct that occurs before its effective date. It is this last provision, retroactive
application, that is the most troublesome. Representative John Conyers, Jr. (D-Mich) commented
that:
Thousands of meritorious cases will retroactively lose a substantial portion of their present
value. Philip A. Lacovara, who represents the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants, conceded, "We're talking very big numbers. There are probably billions of dol-
lars in claim where you treble the damages." Nat'l L.J., Sept. 6, 1986, at 2114. Lacovara
did not ask the next question: Who should pay the tab-the accountants, who profited from
the fraud, or the American taxpayer or other victims.
6 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) 10 (Sept. 4, 1990).
308 Myths, supra note 38, at 1049-1101 (proposed legislation incorporating the "gate keeper"
concept).
309 LrrrLE CAESAR, supra note 1, at 175.
310 LrrtE CAESAR, supra note 1, at 79.
311 See supra note 11.
312 U.S. ATr'y GEN., 1984 ANN. REP. 42 (1985).
313 See generally Note, Insider Abuse and Criminal Misconduct in Financial Institutions: A Crisis?, 64 No-
TRE DAME L. REV. 222 (1989), for an excellent review of the studies linking criminal abuse in the
S&Ls to our present national crisis.
314 N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1989, at Il, col. 1 (Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady says Bush
Administration's proposed $90 billion rescue plan of savings industry will cost additional $24 billion;
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The cost of this S&L "bail-out" plan escalates by more than $1 billion
monthly.315 At least four independent studies link a large percentage of
this cost to fraud and insider abuse, two prevalent forms of criminal mis-
conduct in the S&Ls. For instance, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency studied over 200 failed and healthy S&Ls and reported that
fraud and insider abuse was a significant cause of forty-six percent of the
failures.3 16 The General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed 184 Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured banks that closed in 1987
and concluded sixty-four percent of the failed banks revealed insider
abuse, and thirty-eight percent insider fraud.3 17 The GAO considered
significant insider abuse or fraud as the distinguishing characteristic of
failed S&Ls.318 A congressional study of 105 failed and failing banks
concluded fifty percent of the failures "are caused, in large part, by the
criminal misconduct of officers, directors, and insiders. '319 Finally the
FDIC itself said that for the failures between 1980-83, forty-five percent
of the failures revealed criminal misconduct as the "major contributing
factor."3 20 The cost of fraud in America is staggering, and probably
greatly underestimated. Absent RICO, "neither the banking nor the
criminal justice systems impose effective sanctions or punishment to de-
ter white-collar bank fraud."'3 2' John L. Douglas, general counsel to the
FDIC, testified that "the RICO statute can be an important instrument to
deter.., improper behavior [in banks and S&Ls] and to facilitate lost
recovery of funds."3 22
B. Commodities Fraud
National headlines similarly may underscore, but seriously underes-
timate, the extent of fraud in the commodities industry. While former
Assistant U.S. Attorney Anton Valukas said the Chicago probe unearthed
fraud in hundreds of thousands of trades, national commentators have
suggested that in the aggregate, commodities fraud may cost Americans
total projected spending to rescue savings industry under Bush plan, including significant amounts
of interest, now comes to $157.6 billion). But this too may grossly underestimate the carnage in the
S&L's. Other estimates place the total at $300 billion over 30 years, with approximately 350 insol-
vent thrifts. Some even warn the price tag may exceed $500 billion. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1990, at Cl,
col. 5.
315 N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1989, § IV, at 23, col. 2 (William Proxmire says savings and loans losses
grow by at least one billion dollars a month every month).
316 OFFCE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK FAILURE: AN EVALUATION OF THE FAC-
TORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE OF THE NATIONAL BANKS, 9 (1988).
317 Examination and Supervision of Depository Institutions: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1989) (unpublished statement of Frederick D.
Wolf, Director, General Accounting Office, Accounting and Financial Management Division, at 21)
(statement on file at NOTRE DAME L. REv.).
318 Id. at 29.
319 HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, FEDERAL RESPONSE TO CRIMINAL MISCONDUCT
AND INSIDER ABUSE IN THE NATION'S FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, H.R. REP. No. 1137, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 29-30 (1984) (study of the Commerce Consumer and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee).
320 Id at 30.
321 H.R. REP. No. 1137, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1984) (Bernard Committee report).
322 Hearings on H.R. 1046 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (hearings not officially printed as of current date) (Testimony of John L.
Douglas, July 20, 1989).
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nearly $200 million. 323 Yet, without RICO, commodities traders joked
for years that the tri-partite regulatory scheme was nothing more than a
"paper-tiger" regulator.8 24 As the Chicago Probe aptly demonstrated,
however, RICO and the Commodity Exchange Act can be used to com-
plement one another by providing remedies for different wrongs.3 25
This statutory combination can, perhaps, best insure that America's fu-
tures market retains investor confidence, and continues as the preemi-
nent commodities hedging market in the world.
C. Insurance Fraud
The Medicare and private insurance industries are also besieged by
fraud. For instance, the reimbursement of Medicare expenses by private
insurance groups is engaged in "what may become the biggest financial
scandal in the history of Medicare: the misspending of as much as $10
billion in Medicare funds over the past six years."'3 26 The Department of
Justice is currently completing a probe of the apparent scam. More per-
vasively, the American Insurance Industry Association estimates that 15
to 20%o of all claims are fraudulent and that such claims cost policy hold-
ers $13.75 billion in premiums. 327 Aetna, AllState, Lloyd's of London,
and State Farm, among others, have all used RICO to protect themselves
against insurance-policy fraud, and in so doing, saved American consum-
ers millions of dollars in insurance premiums. "RICO reform would
have a 'chilling effect' on anti-fraud activities of insurance regulators and
would 'dash the expected returns to victims in present RICO
actions.' ",328
Insurance companies, like S&Ls, also threaten insolvency on a na-
tional scale. Gerald Morlitz, a director of Arthur Anderson & Co.,
prophesied, "I think its the savings and loans five years deferred without
any bailout."3 29 Although the studies are not as complete as those done
on the S&Ls, preliminary "autopsies" reveal the causes to include signifi-
gant levels of fraud.330 Since there presently is no federal "bail-out" for
consumers left with no insurance coverage, we should be particularly sus-
323 S. REP. No. 495, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. V (1982). See RICO Reform: Hearings on H.R. 3240 Before
the House Comm. on theJudiciaty, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 238 (1989) (Testimony of Phillip A. Feigin,
commissioner of the Colorado Division of Securities, "I think the average national losses of $200
million is very conservative... Cass Willard estimated, that it was a billion dollars."). This number is
uniformly low as the volume of futures trading has increased much faster than the budgets of the
CTFC. Perhaps the most egregious abuse of the commodities markets has been the attempt by the
Hunt brothers to corner the silver market during 1979 and 1980. Nelson Bunker Hunt, William
Herbert Hunt, Lamar Hunt and others were convicted of violation of the Commodity Exchange Act,
RICO, and anti-trust laws, and the plaintiff, Minpeco S.A. a Peruvian minerals firm, was awarded
$132 million in damages. Minpeco S.A. v. Hunt, (S.D.N.Y. No. 81 Civ. 7619 [MEL]); see 1988 Civ.
RICO Rep. (Andrews) 3477 (March).
324 Newkirk, supra note 9, at 3, col. 1.
325 Note, supra note 10, at 123, 124.
326 Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
327 N.Y. Times, Jul. 6, 1980, at 17, col. 1.
328 1989 Civ. RICO Lit. Rep. (Andrews) 4700 (May) (Testimony of Jim Long, North Carolina
Insurance Commissioner).
329 N.Y. Times, Jan. 6., 1990, at 18, col. 1.
330 See Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1988, at A1, col. 6 ("Autopsies of several failed insurers across the
country have turned up evidence of frauds and inadequate regulations.").
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pect of efforts to short circuit RICO redress: "[RICO] is probably the
single most effective deterrent which presently exists against national
and international conspiracies to evade oversight by insurance regulators
and to defraud consumers of insurance products." 3'
D. Securities Fraud
The merger activity that fueled much of the bull run of the 1980s has
also been afflicted with its share of fraud. The Wall Street Journal observed
prophetically (before the 1989 indictments of Milken and Drexel):
"[T]he abuse of inside information in the take over game is endemic and
has grown systematically over the past half-decade. s33 2 Some commen-
tators have linked this abuse of insider information333 to the crash of
Black Monday, October 19, 1987.334 Much of the takeover game was so
complex, that the RICO litigation is only now filtering through the
courts, four and five years later.33 5 Although not curative in the abso-
lute, RICO has been perceived as an effective adjunct to the SEC and
Justice Department in their regulation of the takeover "game. 33 6
331 Hearings on H.R. 1046 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (hearings not officially printed as of current date) (Testimony ofJim Long,
May 4, 1989, at 1).
332 Wall St.J., Feb. 17, 1987, at A27, col. 1.
333 Even lawyers were indicted for their role in insider trading scams. Alfred Elliot, a former
partner at Schiff Hardin & Waite, was sentenced to five years in prison for insider trading arising
from nine purchases of stock in companies that were clients ofSchiffHardin or that were acquisition
targets ofSchiffHardin clients. United States v. Elliot, 88 Cr. D. N.Ill, 8/30/89. As noted at 21 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1397 September 15, 1989: 1
Thereafter, inJuly 1988, Elliot was charged in a 70-count indictment with wire fraud, secur-
ities fraud, and income tax evasion. He was the first person indicted on insider trading
charges to be accused of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
the U.S. Attorney's office said at the time.
Apparently in his glee at having copped a plea, and avoiding a "guilty" adjudication (although he
received five years plus $332,000 in fines plus disgorgement of $350,000 in illegal profits), Mr. Elliot
forgot about the commencement of his prison term and failed to show prompting a nationwide FBI
man-hunt. See Nat. L.J., Nov. 13, 1989, at 2.
334 Avner Arbet, Professor of Finance at Cornell University, has argued that "the crash is but a
symptom of dangerous inefficiency in the stock market.., behind the inefficient and volatile pricing:
insider trading." FoRBEs, Jul. 10, 1989, at 60-61. "Arbel recommends more effective policing of
institutional activity and more timely public disclosure ofmerger negotiations. In short, Arbel wants
to see more federal policing." &al at 61. Although certainly not causal in his analysis, Professor
Arbel is not alone in his analysis, nor his plea for more federal policing.
335 See, e.g., In Re Phillips Petroleum Securities Litigation, (3rd Cir. Aug. 9, 1989) (Nos. 88-3719
& 88-3755) which chronicles Boone Pickens' attempt to take control over Phillips Petroleum Co. in
1984, and the allegedly fraudulent scheme which violated RICO. Professor Johnson anticipated
such redress not only against the Wall Street sharks, but also by the spurned predator against the
evasive prey in her piece Predator's Rights: Multiple Remedies for Wall Street Sharks Under the Securities Laws
and RICO, 10J. CORP. L. 3 (1984). Shareholders too are seeking remedies against sharks. In Rubin
v. Posner, 701 F. Supp. 1041 (D. Del. 1988), shareholders of PEC brought suit against PEC presi-
dent Victor Posner alleging that he entered into a secret agreement with Ivan Boesky to "park" stock
illegally. When PEC announced their tender offer for Fishbach Corp. stock, Boesky sold the stock to
PEC at an inflated price, and then sold it to an entity controlled by Posner for less than one-half the
market price. The shareholders alleged losses of over $15 million. The 10(b)-5 securities fraud
claim was upheld against summary judgment, and also deemed sufficient to form the predicate acts
necessary for 1962(c) and 1962(d) RICO charges (Drexel was dismissed from the action).
336 Some publications like Barron's noted the similarity between Drexel's fraudulent junk bond
schemes and Charles "Ponzi's" schemes of 1920. See B. Stein, The Biggest Scam Ever? Drexel/Milken
Was a Giant Ponzi Scheme, BARtoN's, Feb. 19, 1990, at 9 ("Wasn't this just like a classic Ponzi
scheme?") ("Drexel/Milkenism was largely a vast scam based upon myths about bond-valuing skills
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A previously overlooked source of fraud in the securities markets
involves the sale of penny stocks (speculative issues that commonly sell
for less than $1 share) to unknowing consumers. Fraud and manipula-
tion in the penny stock market, much of it centered in Denver, Colorado,
is now estimated to cost consumers $2 billion annually.33 7 The North
American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) Report on
Fraud and Abuse in the Penny Stock Industry concluded:
Penny stock swindles are now the No. 1 threat of fraud and abuse fac-
ing small investors in the United States ... The penny stock industry
increasingly is dominated by utterly worthless or highly dubious secur-
ities offerings that are systemically manipulated by repeat offenders of
state and federal securities laws and other felons, some of whom have
and bond value, kept going by a vast Ponzi controlling markets, prices, reputation and data about
defaults, offering the kind of profits that a decade-long scam involving tens of billions of dollars of
phony bonds would offer.") Idl at 32; B. Stein, Memo to Judge Wood: Why Milken Deserves a Stiff Sentence,
BARRON'S, Sept. 24, 1990, at 17 ("Michael Milken was the maestro of a Ponzi scheme of staggering
proportions."); Myths, supra note 38, at 895-96 n.1 19 ("[T]he resemblances between the rise and fall
of Michael Milken's junk bond empire and Charles Ponzi's postal arbitrage scheme are haunting.").
The parallels to the original Charles Ponzi scam are uncanny. Ponzi was an Italian immigrant who,
from 1919 to 1920, masterminded a $20 million dollar scam. He sold coupons to investors promis-
ing 50% return on investment in 90 days. This outrageous return encouraged the investors to re-
turn with their friends, and the operation snowballed. More money continued to be invested in the
scam than the amount due to be paid back, so nearly 40,000 investors flocked to the Ponzi's Finan-
cial Exchange Co. on School Street in Boston. Ponzi spent the investors' money lavishly, buying a
mansion, suits, diamonds and even gambling away $3 million in a single night. When the Boston
Globe exposed his criminal record, Ponzi's pyramid tumbled. Investors demanded their money and
Ponzi was $5 million short. See J. NAsH, BLOODLETrERS & BADMEN 448-451 (1973). Ponzi pleaded
guilty to federal mail fraud and received a 5-year prison term. He then was convicted of four counts
of larceny in state courts and received seven to nine years in state prison. Commonwealth v. Ponzi,
256 Mass. 159, 152 N.E. 207 (1925). He was later deported. Ponzi v. Fesenden 258 U.S. 254 (1922)
(mail fraud and larceny constitute two separate crimes for purposes of deportation). So too,
Drexel's failure can be traced to a financing method that only worked with more customers coming
in than going out. Apart from the massive fraud Drexel plead guilty to, Drexel also "borrowed from
Peter to pay Paul." N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1990, at C6. col 1.
The way Drexel financed its operations was particularly perilous, they said, and is atypical of
the rest of the street. "Drexel's capital structure was far different from other brokerage
firms," said Jeffrey Bowman, an analyst at Standard & Poor's ... Drexel relied heavily on a
technique called 'double leverage' to finance its broker-dealer operations. Double leverage
means a firm borrows at the holding company level and lends those funds to a subsidiary,
which in turn can use the money as collateral with which to raise more money. Essentially
the same funds can be put to work twice .. .Drexel was twice as double leveraged as its
competitors... What Drexel appears to have done was to borrow at the holding company
level in the short term commercial paper market and use that money to finance its subsidi-
ary's portfolio of high-yield, high-risk "junk bond." These bonds became illiquid and did
not produce the required cash flow... "It was a very imprudent capital structure," said a
financial executive at a large Wall Street firm, "My guess is that it's not practiced by anyone
who intends to live for a long time."
Drexel didn't. "Sadly, Drexel's departure from among the quick and Milken's effective incapacita-
tion came too late.., to help scores of companies, thousands of investors, and millions of taxpay-
ers." A. Abelson, BARRON'S, Feb. 19, 1990, at 37.
337 Wall St.J., Feb. 26, 1990, at C14, col. 3.
Meyer Blinder, the Denver penny stock king, and four of his associates were indicted by a
federal grand jury in Las Vegas on I I criminal counts of securities and wire fraud racketeer-
ing and money laundering. The criminal indictment raises the pitch of the federal govern-
ment's 12-year battle to topple the penny-stock empire fashioned by Mr. Blinder .... The
SEC has pursued Mr. Blinder for 12 years and at least 29 states have brought 35 different
regulatory actions against the firm.
Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 1989, at 5, col. 1; see also Hayes & Waldhotz, Penny Stock Broker Indicted in First
Such Use of RICO Law, Wall St.J., Oct. 6, 1989, at B4, col. 1.
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been identified as having ties to organized crime. Since unmanipu-
lated penny stock investors are believed to lose all or some of their
investment 70 percent of the time... the presence of fraud pushes up
that figure to 90 percent.33 8
The litigation redressing these consumer frauds has only started. None-
theless, RICO promises to be one of the principal forces in recovering
some of the fraudulent money from this "No. 1 threat" to the small
investor.8 3 9
E. Pension Fund Fraud
Other types of fraud are less patent, and ultimately more disturbing.
Thirty-nine million American workers plan to retire in whole or in part
upon the proceeds of the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation
(PBGC). In 1987, $1.6 trillion were held in the Corporation for the ben-
efit of these workers.3 40 Yet the PBGC itself reported a deficit of $4 bil-
lion in 1987 to pay its immediate distributions.3 4 ' Moreover, the Labor
Department has stated that the public accountant reporting on these
pension plans within the PBGC is "inadequate. 3 4 2 Fraud plays a causal
role in the pilferring of these American pension plans.3 43 Silently, nearly
forty million futures are being mortgaged: "Unless steps are taken now,
todays S&L bail-out may become tomorrow's ERISA nightmare."3 4 4
RICO is ideally suited to promise the best long-run protection for these
Americans because RICO has long been applied to stop the "mafia"
pilferring of union pension funds.3 4 5 One recent analysis concluded:
"Oftentimes, the most potent criminal cause of action against fiduciaries
and nonfiduciaries [of pension funds] will be the state and federal RICO
laws. These causes of action are an indispensable weapon in the fight
against pension scam artists."3 46
338 NORTH AM. SEC. ADM'RS ASS'N, THE NASAA REPORT ON FRAUD AND ABUSE IN THE PENNY
STOCK INDUSTRY, 1 (1989).
339 See, e.g., Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 1989 WL 56113 (E.D.Pa. 1989) (not
reported in F. Supp.) (Blinder Robinson & Co., one of the national market makers in penny stocks,
with administrative actions pending against it in at least 24 separate jurisdictions preliminarily en-
joined from transferring funds outside the United States in light of probable success on the merits of
RICO and securities violations counts); Rinaldi v.James J. Duane & Co., 801 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (RICO claim for penny stock fraud not particular, but repleading allowed); Hugo v.
Drumaqin, 1987 WL 13227 (E.D.Pa. 1987) (not reported in F. Supp.) (RICO claim against penny
stock salesman not subject to summary judgment); Telman v. Capt. Crab, Inc., 1986 WL 13722
(N.D.III. 1986) (Transfer granted in RICO allegations against issuer and securities syndicate in sale
of penny stocks). See also Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1989, at B4, col. 1.
340 See generally Note, Who Should Pay When Federally Insured Pension Funds Go Broke?: A Strategy for
Recovering from the Wrongdoers, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 301, 365 (1990).
341 Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1987 at
3.
342 Wall St. J., June 5, 1989, at A6, col. 1 (A major financial crisis in pension funds could
develop).
343 See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. PUB. No. HRD-87-42, GOVERNEMNT INSUR-
ANCE PROGRAM THREATENED By ITS GROWING DEFICIT 12 (1987) (fraud one of causes).
344 UNITED STATES DEPT. OF LABOR, SEMIANNUAL REP., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN. 3 (1989).
345 Recently too, RICO has had success in redressing the victims of pension fraud. See, e.g., Craw-
ford v. La Boucherie Bernard Ltd., No. 83-0780 (D.D.C. 1989) (participants can sue fiduciaries on
behalf of plan under RICO for fraudulent conversion of plan assets), aff'd, 815 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987).
346 Note, supra note 340, at 365.
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F. Department of Justice (DOJ) "Probes"
New probes by the Justice Department threaten to uncover millions
of dollars of fraud in the entertainment industry. Organized crime
figures appear to have been laundering money to front the million dollar
budgets that motion pictures now command.3 47 Organized crime simi-
larly evades hundreds of millions of dollars in gasoline and cigarette
taxes alone.3 48 Our own federal government is not immune to these alle-
gations. Defense procurement contracts have led to allegations that bil-
lions of dollars have been unjustly billed to the American taxpayers.3 49 A
major scandal in HUD accounted for hundreds of millions of dollars of
fraud. 350 Doubtless, major sectors of the American economy will come
under increasing scrutiny in the following months. The power of RICO
to effectualize these Justice Department probes and the magnitude of the
yet unredressed fraud poignantly illustrate the necessity of maintaining
RICO's vitality.
G. La Cosa Nostra
Beyond fraud, however, lies the application of RICO to organized
crime, political corruption, and violent "hate" groups. Organized crime
has obviously been the central target, if not limitation, of RICO. RICO
indictments and convictions have increased the effectiveness of our na-
tion's battle against the "mafia" by an order of magnitude.35 ' The stun-
ning success of RICO in convicting the "Bosses" of the "Five Families"
in New York City prompted former U.S. Attorney Rudolph Giuliani to
say "the mafia is a dying organization and will cease to be a major threat
within ten years."'3 52 To constitutionally cripple pattern construction
347 See Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 1989, at B1, col. 3 (Eugene Giaquinto, a close associate of many La
Cosa Nostra members and allegedly a nephew of Edward Scindra, a Buffalo "Family" member, ad-
mitted in affidavit that at least four movies were all laundered mob money.) (Salvatore Pisello, a
suspected member of the Gambino "Family", received hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash and
records from MCA's record unit even though he had no previous experience in the industry.).
348 See H.R. No. 1629, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1978) (34 states losing $400 million each year
from cigarette tax evasion); N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1989, at 1, col. 2 ("By 1984, the estimated illict take
[from gasoline tax evasion] was $300 million a year in the New York area alone.").
349 131 CONG. REC. 11,885 (Sept. 20, 1985) (testimony of Senator Biden) ("That the figure [for
defense fraud] must be enormous is indicated by a variety of factors ... A general estimate of fraud
in [non-defense] programs was put at 1 to 10 percent by the U.S. Department ofJustice... [I]f that
estimate were to be applied to the defense budget, it would mean that between $2.85 billion and
$28.5 billion of fraud is worked on our national government each year."). Hundreds of cases of
military fraud are yet to be disposed of. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1989, at 1, col. 6. Some individual
claims are staggering. Wall St. J., January 8, 1990, at A14, col. 1 (Unisys expected to enter guilty
plea soon for $130 million).
350 Wall St. J., June 19, 1989, at 5, col. 1. See also Wall St. J., July 12, 1989, at A3, col. 3 (HUD
scandals may reach cost of $2 billion).
351 See Effectiveness of the Government's Attack on La Cosa Nostra, at 14 (General Accounting
Office, April 14, 1988): "Prior to the passage of [RICO], attacking an organized criminal group was
an awkward affair ... With the passage of RICO, the entire picture of the organization's criminal
behavior and the involvement of its leaders in directing that behavior could be captured and
presented."
352 N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1987, at B3, col. 2 ("Mr. Giuliani attributed what he said was the demise
of the mafia to two factors: the vigorous prosecution under strengthened racketeering laws [RICO],
and the shifting demographics that have made it difficult for Mafia leaders to recruit new members
. .."). To graphically illustrate the basis of such rationale, we need only examine the New York
Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at 1, col. 1, where the "Bosses" of the "Five Families" and their heirs to the
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within RICO would be tantamount to disarming the Justice Department
in their battle against a well-armed, internationally organized, "La Cosa
Nostra" of the 1990s.
H. Political Corruption & Racist Hate Groups
Political corruption has been particularly difficult to prosecute in our
majoritarian government. Nonetheless, RICO has been used effectively
against judges,3 53 politicians, 354 and lawyers.3 55 The Chicago Greylord
scandal in which thirteen judges and forty-seven lawyers were convicted
of racketeering activity illuminated the widespread corruption of seg-
ments of our judiciary, and perhaps best demonstrated how RICO can
disinfect our legal apparatus.3 56 Similarly, violent "hate" groups, tradi-
tionally hard to prosecute under state law conspiracy statutes, have been
forcefully eradicated under the guidance of RICO.3 57
VI. Conclusion
It is ironic that the most libertarian Justice on the Court should most
fear RICO-particularly at a time when the individual citizen is
threatened with scandals in the S&L and insurance industry, fraudulent
investment schemes in the commodities and securities markets, and vio-
lence from drug cartel members and racist hate groups.358 It is almost
inconceivable, that in an age when white collar crime poses the most seri-
ous threat to America, one of the most effective and promising deter-
rents-RICO-is being hamstrung with allegations of "vagueness."
throne were listed: Gambino "Family": Peter Gotti and Angelo Ruggiero named successors to John
Gotti-John Gotti indicted pending trial for racketeering; Genovese "Family": Vincent Gigante
named successor to Anthony Salerno-Salerno sentenced to 100 years in prison; Luchese "Family":
Aniello Migliore named successor to Anthony Corallo-Corallo sentenced to 100 years in prison;
Colombo [formerly Profuci] "Family": Victor Orena named successor to Carmine Persico-Persico
sentenced to 100 years in prison; Bonnano "Family": Joseph Massina named successor to Phillip
Rastelli-Rastelli sentenced to 12 years in prison.
353 See, e.g., United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066, 1074-75 (5th Cir. Unit AJul. 1981) (Flor-
ida's Third Judicial Circuit); United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985) (state judge
prosecuted in Greylord scandal in Chicago).
354 United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993, 994-95 (5th Cir. Unit AJul.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1072 (1982) (office of the governor); United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 896 (1981); United States v. Mandel, (4th Cir. 1979) (conviction of governor of Maryland
for RICO mail fraud and bribery), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980), set aside, 862 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir.
1988) (in light of McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987) (no intangible rights mail fraud)).
355 See, e.g., United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1185-86 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (lawyers and
city council members), rev'd on other grounds, 673 F.2d 578 (3rd Cir. 1982).
356 See, e.g., United States v. Yonan, 800 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1986).
357 See, e.g., United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1526-28, 1540, 1546 (9th Cir. 1988)
(conviction of "Order" or "Bruders Schweign" white hate group for the robbery and murder of Alan
Berg); United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 53, 55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 917 (1983)
(Croatian nationalist terrorists convictions under RICO). See also New York Times, Jun. 11, 1987, at
A22, col. 4 (Anti-Defamation League concludes that federal prosecutors have "depleted the leader-
ship" of several groups).
358 See, e.g., 1989 Civ. RICO Lit. Rep. (Andrews) 4700 (May) ("Phillip A Feigin, securities com-
missioner of the Colorado Division of Securities ... said that 'white collar crime has grown from a
major problem to a national catastrophe.' Scandals caused by insider trading and other types of
fraud 'have signifigantly eroded the public's faith in our markets, industries, and financial institutions
and raised fundamental questions about our ethics as a nation... Yet in the context of this crisis in
faith and ethics the members of the financial community have called upon Congress to emasculate
private civil RICO.").
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But the void-for-vagueness doctrine as applied by the Supreme
Court is principled and well developed. At the circuit court level, RICO
pattern was unanimously held sufficiently definite and constitutional.
Moreover, the civil RICO provisions which garner the most criticism rely
on the very same pattern that the criminal provisions do. Even if the
Court conspicuously failed to construe the civil and criminal provisions
in pari matenia, there is only one precedent for finding a civil statute un-
constitutionally vague in over one-hundred years of Supreme Court
jurisprudence.
Rather, the Scalia concurrence in H.J. Inc. should properly be viewed
as invective, designed to focus the RICO debate on the policy choices of
federalism and organized crime-views clearly rejected by a majority of
the Court. More importantly however, these policy views are dwarfed by
the catastrophic consequences hamstringing our federal prosecutors
would have on the American public. Attempts to label RICO pattern
void-for-vagueness should be rejected. Lower courts and litigants alike
should properly apply the circuit court precedents and the well defined
principles of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to find RICO pattem suffi-
ciently definite for Constitutional application, and remove the vagueness
"albatross" from ensuing RICO litigation.
Joseph E. Bauerschmidt
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